Fairness of Common Lottery?

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:"Gaming," in this application, only means trying to anticipate how to use your picks strategically. So in the proposed "separate lottery" scenario suggested above, an applicant might really want Mundo Verde as their number 1 pick, but might be scared off by the astronomical odds of going into that huge pool. So they might put DC Billingual as #1 instead on the assumption that odds will be more in their favor. This is "gaming" the system, and it encourages people to improve their odds by not ranking their true preference if the odds are long.

The current algorithm is designed to improve the satisfaction of matched families. There aren't enough highly coveted seats to go around, but let's make sure that the families who get them had at least ranked them highly.

I'm not sure what you're getting at. Under the current system, how highly you ranked a choice has no bearing on whether you get in there. The only two factors that matter are what your lottery number is and whether you got into any of your higher ranked choices. You could rank a school #12 and be the only person admitted if you had a high lottery number and your one through eleven choices were already full.

Correct, but those who have high lottery numbers got their top choices. The common lottery has eliminated the scenario where people got lucky at a hot school but couldn't make the commute or weren't actually that interested in immersion. Now the people who get good numbers get to go to the schools they really want.

(Your scenario in which someone with a great number gets matched at their #12 is possible, but not likely. If MySchool is to be believed, 86 percent of matched families matched at their 1, 2, or 3 choices.)

But under the current system, someone with a great number who ranked a hot school #2 or #3 could easily get into that school ahead of someone who was dying to go to that same hot school and ranked it #1. It would be an improvement if there was a way to consider the ranking of the school and draw in pools by ranking. It would improve the very result you're saying the current system has brought about, and further eliminate someone getting a school that wasn't their #1 pick over someone who did want it #1 (all else being equal, i.e. preference).

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:I certainly don't have an alternative, but it really is frustrating when you see that your number one choice was the number 12 choice for many people who got in. You genuinely want that spot in that school- for whatever reason. You love the location, the curriculum, the people, etc. But, while you have to hear everyone moaning and complaining about how awful their spot in your favorite school is... you are Crossing your fingers that they will drop their spot, waiting patiently all summer for a spot to open, calling throughout September, moving your child last minute... its just frustrating.

It does seem like a person who genuinely wants a school should have preference over someone who really could care less.


But, like I said, I have no alternative to propose.

I think it's a mistake to say that someone who ranked their school 12 could care less. The choices in DC are so stark that #12 could be a big step up from being shut out.

But I don't think that scenario really happens. I don't believe that there is any grade in DC where there are more than 10 schools that don't take every kid who applies. Maybe pre-k?

That said, one solution would be to limit the number of choices. Twelve is kind of ridiculous, there's no way a family can make informed decisions about that many schools. If people were limited to six choices the choices would be more meaningful. It would also mean that more people would be shut out and more would be placed in the second round. I suspect that OSSE recognizes that choices 6-12 are essentially the same as random assignment, it's just administratively easier to assign as many kids as possible in the first round of the lottery.

There a LOT more than 10 schools that don't take everyone who applies. Ignoring PK3 and 4, where nearly all schools have waitlists and nobody is guaranteed a spot, here are the number of DCPS schools that have Round 1 waitlists for each grade this year, followed by the school with the longest list and the number on the list. For k-12, yes everyone has an inbounds school, but parents may still want to move their kids elsewhere. I realize that some schools might clear their waistlists over the summer or before count day, but you might be surprised at how long the waitlists are at dozens of schools--and since there might be less than a handful of spaces in a given grade, the lists may not move that fast.

K: 63, Eaton, 172
1: 61, Janney, 125
2: 62, Eaton, 82
3: 62, Janney, 78
4: 52, Janney, 63
5: 41, Murch, 27
6: 14, Deal, 127
7: 12, Deal, 79
8: 13, Deal, 73
9: 14, Wilson, 321
10: 6, Wilson, 125
11:7, Wilson, 89
12: 2, Wilson, 25

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:This has been a good discussion, and it's interesting that several people want to make this bizarre (to me) distinction between "your first choice school" and "the school you think you have the best odds of getting into" and that opting for #2 is somehow an awful, horrible thing for a system to support.

But you know what? If I decide that the most important thing for my kids (and my sanity as a parent) is to get into what I consider a very good match for my kids, even if it's not my dream school, that school BECOMES my first choice if I'm valuing the odds of getting in. Who are you (people so concerned with "gaming the system") to decide that I am doing something bad or wrong or that the outcome will be better if I rank my #1 dream school #1, get shut out, and then have such a crappy number that I get into none of my 12 schools or only #12? Why are you happier with that system than a system that says that at least all those accepted to the most popular schools each had to choose (because remember: you can only choose ONE school as #1!)?

The whole idea that you're "gaming" because you're including in your considerations whether you have a better shot at one school than another is both obnoxious and still not explained in a way that makes sense. Are you also going to insist that parents not consider commute, or whether it's got good special ed services, because that is gaming the system too? The definition of "#1 pick" is that it's the school you want to put as #1, for whatever your reasons are. We may be overly optimistic, discussing ways we think the current system can improve,, but the conversation about parents being "strategic" about rankings is just bizarre as hell. No one, not even a Nobel Laureate, can create an algorithm that prevents parents from "being strategic", even the current system. Feeling that IT/MV/TR or whatever as my first pick IS strategic.

Because when you get into a school someone else gets shut out.

If there's only one spot, should it go to the family with the better lottery number, or the one with the optimal strategy? That's the argument against gaming in a nutshell. Keep in mind that no one will know until the lottery runs what strategy will be optimal, it depends on how the chips land. So it's just as random as lottery numbers, only not so predictable. If you end up with a good lottery number putting your #1 pick #1 is a brilliant strategy, with a poor lottery number it's a death-knell to any of your top picks.

The current system doesn't prevent people from being strategic, it just minimized the impact when they do so. Allowing rankings to affect outcomes might make people feel better because they'll feel like they have more control, but it won't improve overall outcomes -- there are only so many seats to go around -- and is likely to make them worse.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:"Gaming," in this application, only means trying to anticipate how to use your picks strategically. So in the proposed "separate lottery" scenario suggested above, an applicant might really want Mundo Verde as their number 1 pick, but might be scared off by the astronomical odds of going into that huge pool. So they might put DC Billingual as #1 instead on the assumption that odds will be more in their favor. This is "gaming" the system, and it encourages people to improve their odds by not ranking their true preference if the odds are long.

The current algorithm is designed to improve the satisfaction of matched families. There aren't enough highly coveted seats to go around, but let's make sure that the families who get them had at least ranked them highly.

I'm not sure what you're getting at. Under the current system, how highly you ranked a choice has no bearing on whether you get in there. The only two factors that matter are what your lottery number is and whether you got into any of your higher ranked choices. You could rank a school #12 and be the only person admitted if you had a high lottery number and your one through eleven choices were already full.

Correct, but those who have high lottery numbers got their top choices. The common lottery has eliminated the scenario where people got lucky at a hot school but couldn't make the commute or weren't actually that interested in immersion. Now the people who get good numbers get to go to the schools they really want.

(Your scenario in which someone with a great number gets matched at their #12 is possible, but not likely. If MySchool is to be believed, 86 percent of matched families matched at their 1, 2, or 3 choices.)

But under the current system, someone with a great number who ranked a hot school #2 or #3 could easily get into that school ahead of someone who was dying to go to that same hot school and ranked it #1. It would be an improvement if there was a way to consider the ranking of the school and draw in pools by ranking. It would improve the very result you're saying the current system has brought about, and further eliminate someone getting a school that wasn't their #1 pick over someone who did want it #1 (all else being equal, i.e. preference).

I doubt the person with the higher lottery number would consider it an improvement if they got shut out while someone with a lower lottery number got a spot at their #2 pick.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:This has been a good discussion, and it's interesting that several people want to make this bizarre (to me) distinction between "your first choice school" and "the school you think you have the best odds of getting into" and that opting for #2 is somehow an awful, horrible thing for a system to support.

But you know what? If I decide that the most important thing for my kids (and my sanity as a parent) is to get into what I consider a very good match for my kids, even if it's not my dream school, that school BECOMES my first choice if I'm valuing the odds of getting in. Who are you (people so concerned with "gaming the system") to decide that I am doing something bad or wrong or that the outcome will be better if I rank my #1 dream school #1, get shut out, and then have such a crappy number that I get into none of my 12 schools or only #12? Why are you happier with that system than a system that says that at least all those accepted to the most popular schools each had to choose (because remember: you can only choose ONE school as #1!)?

The whole idea that you're "gaming" because you're including in your considerations whether you have a better shot at one school than another is both obnoxious and still not explained in a way that makes sense. Are you also going to insist that parents not consider commute, or whether it's got good special ed services, because that is gaming the system too? The definition of "#1 pick" is that it's the school you want to put as #1, for whatever your reasons are. We may be overly optimistic, discussing ways we think the current system can improve,, but the conversation about parents being "strategic" about rankings is just bizarre as hell. No one, not even a Nobel Laureate, can create an algorithm that prevents parents from "being strategic", even the current system. Feeling that IT/MV/TR or whatever as my first pick IS strategic.

Because when you get into a school someone else gets shut out.

If there's only one spot, should it go to the family with the better lottery number, or the one with the optimal strategy? That's the argument against gaming in a nutshell. Keep in mind that no one will know until the lottery runs what strategy will be optimal, it depends on how the chips land. So it's just as random as lottery numbers, only not so predictable. If you end up with a good lottery number putting your #1 pick #1 is a brilliant strategy, with a poor lottery number it's a death-knell to any of your top picks.

The current system doesn't prevent people from being strategic, it just minimized the impact when they do so. Allowing rankings to affect outcomes might make people feel better because they'll feel like they have more control, but it won't improve overall outcomes -- there are only so many seats to go around -- and is likely to make them worse.

According to even you (or others who wrote about gaming) it should go to the family who really wanted that school the most. If that is the case, it should go to the family who ranked it #1, not the one with the best random lottery number overall. There would still have to be a lottery for all those choosing the hot school as #1, but least you're guaranteed to only match people who felt strongly enough - whatever their reasons - that they gambled not getting in anywhere else to pick that school as #1. Don't really see how lottery-ing for each school in order of ranking doesn't get you a better overall outcome. No one has explained why that isn't better.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:"Gaming," in this application, only means trying to anticipate how to use your picks strategically. So in the proposed "separate lottery" scenario suggested above, an applicant might really want Mundo Verde as their number 1 pick, but might be scared off by the astronomical odds of going into that huge pool. So they might put DC Billingual as #1 instead on the assumption that odds will be more in their favor. This is "gaming" the system, and it encourages people to improve their odds by not ranking their true preference if the odds are long.

The current algorithm is designed to improve the satisfaction of matched families. There aren't enough highly coveted seats to go around, but let's make sure that the families who get them had at least ranked them highly.

I'm not sure what you're getting at. Under the current system, how highly you ranked a choice has no bearing on whether you get in there. The only two factors that matter are what your lottery number is and whether you got into any of your higher ranked choices. You could rank a school #12 and be the only person admitted if you had a high lottery number and your one through eleven choices were already full.

Correct, but those who have high lottery numbers got their top choices. The common lottery has eliminated the scenario where people got lucky at a hot school but couldn't make the commute or weren't actually that interested in immersion. Now the people who get good numbers get to go to the schools they really want.

(Your scenario in which someone with a great number gets matched at their #12 is possible, but not likely. If MySchool is to be believed, 86 percent of matched families matched at their 1, 2, or 3 choices.)

But under the current system, someone with a great number who ranked a hot school #2 or #3 could easily get into that school ahead of someone who was dying to go to that same hot school and ranked it #1. It would be an improvement if there was a way to consider the ranking of the school and draw in pools by ranking. It would improve the very result you're saying the current system has brought about, and further eliminate someone getting a school that wasn't their #1 pick over someone who did want it #1 (all else being equal, i.e. preference).

I doubt the person with the higher lottery number would consider it an improvement if they got shut out while someone with a lower lottery number got a spot at their #2 pick.

First off, under what's being suggested, you're comparing apples to oranges. If person 1 ranked popular school A as #1 and popular school B as #2, for person 2 to get in to school A, they'd have to have ranked it as #1. It's too bad if person A gets shut out, but why would they feel bad if person 2 felt strongly enough that they wanted school B as their #1 and they got lucky? As all have pointed out, there aren't enough spots, and when I got shut out I'd have felt way better about it if I knew everyone who did get matched either ranked the school #1 or got into a less popular school that they still ranked pretty high.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:"Gaming," in this application, only means trying to anticipate how to use your picks strategically. So in the proposed "separate lottery" scenario suggested above, an applicant might really want Mundo Verde as their number 1 pick, but might be scared off by the astronomical odds of going into that huge pool. So they might put DC Billingual as #1 instead on the assumption that odds will be more in their favor. This is "gaming" the system, and it encourages people to improve their odds by not ranking their true preference if the odds are long.

The current algorithm is designed to improve the satisfaction of matched families. There aren't enough highly coveted seats to go around, but let's make sure that the families who get them had at least ranked them highly.

I'm not sure what you're getting at. Under the current system, how highly you ranked a choice has no bearing on whether you get in there. The only two factors that matter are what your lottery number is and whether you got into any of your higher ranked choices. You could rank a school #12 and be the only person admitted if you had a high lottery number and your one through eleven choices were already full.

Correct, but those who have high lottery numbers got their top choices. The common lottery has eliminated the scenario where people got lucky at a hot school but couldn't make the commute or weren't actually that interested in immersion. Now the people who get good numbers get to go to the schools they really want.

(Your scenario in which someone with a great number gets matched at their #12 is possible, but not likely. If MySchool is to be believed, 86 percent of matched families matched at their 1, 2, or 3 choices.)

But under the current system, someone with a great number who ranked a hot school #2 or #3 could easily get into that school ahead of someone who was dying to go to that same hot school and ranked it #1. It would be an improvement if there was a way to consider the ranking of the school and draw in pools by ranking. It would improve the very result you're saying the current system has brought about, and further eliminate someone getting a school that wasn't their #1 pick over someone who did want it #1 (all else being equal, i.e. preference).

I doubt the person with the higher lottery number would consider it an improvement if they got shut out while someone with a lower lottery number got a spot at their #2 pick.

First off, under what's being suggested, you're comparing apples to oranges. If person 1 ranked popular school A as #1 and popular school B as #2, for person 2 to get in to school A, they'd have to have ranked it as #1. It's too bad if person A gets shut out, but why would they feel bad if person 2 felt strongly enough that they wanted school B as their #1 and they got lucky? As all have pointed out, there aren't enough spots, and when I got shut out I'd have felt way better about it if I knew everyone who did get matched either ranked the school #1 or got into a less popular school that they still ranked pretty high.

Also, it's apples compared to oranges because person 1 and person 2 weren't in the same lottery really. Lottery for people who ranked school A #1 is a different draw than those who ranked school B #1. So how is it really a "lower #"? It's not even in the same draw.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:This has been a good discussion, and it's interesting that several people want to make this bizarre (to me) distinction between "your first choice school" and "the school you think you have the best odds of getting into" and that opting for #2 is somehow an awful, horrible thing for a system to support.

But you know what? If I decide that the most important thing for my kids (and my sanity as a parent) is to get into what I consider a very good match for my kids, even if it's not my dream school, that school BECOMES my first choice if I'm valuing the odds of getting in. Who are you (people so concerned with "gaming the system") to decide that I am doing something bad or wrong or that the outcome will be better if I rank my #1 dream school #1, get shut out, and then have such a crappy number that I get into none of my 12 schools or only #12? Why are you happier with that system than a system that says that at least all those accepted to the most popular schools each had to choose (because remember: you can only choose ONE school as #1!)?

The whole idea that you're "gaming" because you're including in your considerations whether you have a better shot at one school than another is both obnoxious and still not explained in a way that makes sense. Are you also going to insist that parents not consider commute, or whether it's got good special ed services, because that is gaming the system too? The definition of "#1 pick" is that it's the school you want to put as #1, for whatever your reasons are. We may be overly optimistic, discussing ways we think the current system can improve,, but the conversation about parents being "strategic" about rankings is just bizarre as hell. No one, not even a Nobel Laureate, can create an algorithm that prevents parents from "being strategic", even the current system. Feeling that IT/MV/TR or whatever as my first pick IS strategic.

Because when you get into a school someone else gets shut out.

If there's only one spot, should it go to the family with the better lottery number, or the one with the optimal strategy? That's the argument against gaming in a nutshell. Keep in mind that no one will know until the lottery runs what strategy will be optimal, it depends on how the chips land. So it's just as random as lottery numbers, only not so predictable. If you end up with a good lottery number putting your #1 pick #1 is a brilliant strategy, with a poor lottery number it's a death-knell to any of your top picks.

The current system doesn't prevent people from being strategic, it just minimized the impact when they do so. Allowing rankings to affect outcomes might make people feel better because they'll feel like they have more control, but it won't improve overall outcomes -- there are only so many seats to go around -- and is likely to make them worse.

According to even you (or others who wrote about gaming) it should go to the family who really wanted that school the most. If that is the case, it should go to the family who ranked it #1, not the one with the best random lottery number overall. There would still have to be a lottery for all those choosing the hot school as #1, but least you're guaranteed to only match people who felt strongly enough - whatever their reasons - that they gambled not getting in anywhere else to pick that school as #1. Don't really see how lottery-ing for each school in order of ranking doesn't get you a better overall outcome. No one has explained why that isn't better.

The bolded part is where you are going a little bit wrong. We've been saying that the system allows families with high numbers to go to schools they want the most. There aren't anywhere near enough coveted spots for there to be enough for families who want them the most. Ranking your choices 1-12 is the way you say which ones you want the most; the rest, unfortunately, comes down to your random lottery number.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

According to even you (or others who wrote about gaming) it should go to the family who really wanted that school the most. If that is the case, it should go to the family who ranked it #1, not the one with the best random lottery number overall. There would still have to be a lottery for all those choosing the hot school as #1, but least you're guaranteed to only match people who felt strongly enough - whatever their reasons - that they gambled not getting in anywhere else to pick that school as #1. Don't really see how lottery-ing for each school in order of ranking doesn't get you a better overall outcome. No one has explained why that isn't better.

Not according to me.

Why does the current system give better overall outcomes than lotterying for each school individually?

1. With individual lotteries, not getting into your #1 is a disaster. It throws you to the end of the line, you don't get to go again until everyone else has gone. Picking a school for your #1 that you don't get into is equivalent to getting the absolute worst number in the lottery. Parents have to decide whether they want to gamble on their number one pick. Some parents will gamble and win. Some will gamble and lose. Some won't gamble, and will also lose: they'll put a safe school as their number one pick, and forego a spot at their true favorite because they actually got a good lottery number. Overall, the number of losers outweighs the number of winners.

2. With individual lotteries, it is possible to have outcomes where two families can trade and both benefits. Since some families are going to hedge and put their second-favorite school first, it's possible that they end up with their second choice while a lower-ranked family gets their first choice, and that they took the first choice of that family. A swap would benefit both. No such swaps are possible under the current system. If modifying the outcome of one system to be more like the another improves outcomes for everyone, I'd say that the second one is better.

3. The biggie: how likely you are to gamble on your number one pick is determined by what your other options are. If you have an OK IB school, or can afford to move or go private, it makes sense to shoot the moon. If your IB school is unacceptable or you can't afford to move or go private, you need to hedge. If you don't play you can't win, so disproportionately the spots at the most competitive schools are going to go to those who already have the best options.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

According to even you (or others who wrote about gaming) it should go to the family who really wanted that school the most. If that is the case, it should go to the family who ranked it #1, not the one with the best random lottery number overall. There would still have to be a lottery for all those choosing the hot school as #1, but least you're guaranteed to only match people who felt strongly enough - whatever their reasons - that they gambled not getting in anywhere else to pick that school as #1. Don't really see how lottery-ing for each school in order of ranking doesn't get you a better overall outcome. No one has explained why that isn't better.

Not according to me.

Why does the current system give better overall outcomes than lotterying for each school individually?

1. With individual lotteries, not getting into your #1 is a disaster. It throws you to the end of the line, you don't get to go again until everyone else has gone. Picking a school for your #1 that you don't get into is equivalent to getting the absolute worst number in the lottery. Parents have to decide whether they want to gamble on their number one pick. Some parents will gamble and win. Some will gamble and lose. Some won't gamble, and will also lose: they'll put a safe school as their number one pick, and forego a spot at their true favorite because they actually got a good lottery number. Overall, the number of losers outweighs the number of winners.

2. With individual lotteries, it is possible to have outcomes where two families can trade and both benefits. Since some families are going to hedge and put their second-favorite school first, it's possible that they end up with their second choice while a lower-ranked family gets their first choice, and that they took the first choice of that family. A swap would benefit both. No such swaps are possible under the current system. If modifying the outcome of one system to be more like the another improves outcomes for everyone, I'd say that the second one is better.

3. The biggie: how likely you are to gamble on your number one pick is determined by what your other options are. If you have an OK IB school, or can afford to move or go private, it makes sense to shoot the moon. If your IB school is unacceptable or you can't afford to move or go private, you need to hedge. If you don't play you can't win, so disproportionately the spots at the most competitive schools are going to go to those who already have the best options.

Nooooo, under the "separate lotteries for each school within the common lottery" idea if you rank the school #1, you still have a better waitlist number for your #1 than anyone who ranked it lower. So first off, NO you do NOT have the equivalent of the worst number in the lottery, not by a longshot. Also, if you put safeties down that won't have a ton of people ranking it #1 (which happens now as well), you enter a separate lottery for everyone who ranked that school say #6, and it's entirely possible that if the people who ranked it higher don't chose it, you could still get in. That doesn't change from one system to another.

2. On what are you basing this idea that a family would put their #2 choice first? Please give a specific scenario and reasons a family would do this, if you know you're probably opting out of your #1 if you don't rank it #1, explain to me the reasons that a family would put their #1 as #2? Especially if their #2 is very popular and will likely fill up with #1s?

3. How is your #3 different under either the current system or the proposed "separate lotteries by #1" system? Why would a family under one system do anything differently under the other? Again, please give a specific scenario, like what would a family do differently and why?

Just trying to understand your points.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

According to even you (or others who wrote about gaming) it should go to the family who really wanted that school the most. If that is the case, it should go to the family who ranked it #1, not the one with the best random lottery number overall. There would still have to be a lottery for all those choosing the hot school as #1, but least you're guaranteed to only match people who felt strongly enough - whatever their reasons - that they gambled not getting in anywhere else to pick that school as #1. Don't really see how lottery-ing for each school in order of ranking doesn't get you a better overall outcome. No one has explained why that isn't better.

Not according to me.

Why does the current system give better overall outcomes than lotterying for each school individually?

1. With individual lotteries, not getting into your #1 is a disaster. It throws you to the end of the line, you don't get to go again until everyone else has gone. Picking a school for your #1 that you don't get into is equivalent to getting the absolute worst number in the lottery. Parents have to decide whether they want to gamble on their number one pick. Some parents will gamble and win. Some will gamble and lose. Some won't gamble, and will also lose: they'll put a safe school as their number one pick, and forego a spot at their true favorite because they actually got a good lottery number. Overall, the number of losers outweighs the number of winners.

2. With individual lotteries, it is possible to have outcomes where two families can trade and both benefits. Since some families are going to hedge and put their second-favorite school first, it's possible that they end up with their second choice while a lower-ranked family gets their first choice, and that they took the first choice of that family. A swap would benefit both. No such swaps are possible under the current system. If modifying the outcome of one system to be more like the another improves outcomes for everyone, I'd say that the second one is better.

3. The biggie: how likely you are to gamble on your number one pick is determined by what your other options are. If you have an OK IB school, or can afford to move or go private, it makes sense to shoot the moon. If your IB school is unacceptable or you can't afford to move or go private, you need to hedge. If you don't play you can't win, so disproportionately the spots at the most competitive schools are going to go to those who already have the best options.

Expanding on PP's post, once you have a spot at some school, you're in a better position to shoot for the moon in subsequent years. So, the first year you list Hardy first, because almost everyone gets in, even though you really prefer Latin.

Once you've secured your 6th grade spot at Hardy, you start lotterying for Latin every year. Now you can list Latin first every year and have a much better chance of getting in than families who have to hedge their bets because they can't afford to be shut out. The net result is that it takes you two or more years to finally get into Latin, the school you really wanted in the first place.

Furthermore, because risk-averse people like you did not list their true preference for Latin for 6th grade, many of those spots went to risk takers with other options, and many them opted for Deal or went private. As a result, some of those secretly-coveted Latin spots went to kids on the wait list, one or more of whom might actually have preferred Hardy to Latin, because, say, they want to attend Wilson, but drew a bad number in the lottery and got wait listed at both Hardy and Latin.

In short, because you kept your preference for Latin secret, you're at Hardy trying to get into Latin and someone else is at Latin trying to get into Hardy, and it will take you both two or more years to land at your preferred school, if ever. The result is a terrible misallocation of very scarce resources.

The only way to avoid this problem is not to penalize applicants for revealing their true preferences the first time around.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:
Nooooo, under the "separate lotteries for each school within the common lottery" idea if you rank the school #1, you still have a better waitlist number for your #1 than anyone who ranked it lower. So first off, NO you do NOT have the equivalent of the worst number in the lottery, not by a longshot. Also, if you put safeties down that won't have a ton of people ranking it #1 (which happens now as well), you enter a separate lottery for everyone who ranked that school say #6, and it's entirely possible that if the people who ranked it higher don't chose it, you could still get in. That doesn't change from one system to another.

You still either get in or you don't, and if you don't get in you're screwed. If you're going to order the waitlist by ranking, if you don't get into your #1 it's going to be very hard to get into your #2, you're behind everyone who put it #1, and for each subsequent pick it gets harder and harder. Not getting your #1 is still tantamount to getting the last number in the lottery, you just have to wait until after the waitlist runs to learn that you're screwed.

Anonymous wrote:
2. On what are you basing this idea that a family would put their #2 choice first? Please give a specific scenario and reasons a family would do this, if you know you're probably opting out of your #1 if you don't rank it #1, explain to me the reasons that a family would put their #1 as #2? Especially if their #2 is very popular and will likely fill up with #1s?

When my kids were in fifth grade I put Deal #1 for sixth even though they said they weren't accepting any OOB kids. I figured if I get an excellent lottery number I'll be high on the waitlist, who knows what will happen, and it doesn't cost me anything. Under your proposal that would have been a very foolish thing to do, it would pretty much have prevented me from getting in anywhere unless I got into Deal. What if I had drawn #1 in the lottery? I'd have given up a chance for a spot at Deal.

Anonymous wrote:
3. How is your #3 different under either the current system or the proposed "separate lotteries by #1" system? Why would a family under one system do anything differently under the other? Again, please give a specific scenario, like what would a family do differently and why?

Just trying to understand your points.

Under the current system your ranking doesn't affect your chance of getting into a school. (More precisely, you can't increase your chances. You can decrease your chances by ranking a school lower of course.) Changing how the slots are given out doesn't change the number of slots, so if you allow rankings to affect chances something has to give. What gives is you increase the riskiness of putting a highly coveted school first. That risk disproportionately affects those with the fewest choices.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:
Expanding on PP's post, once you have a spot at some school, you're in a better position to shoot for the moon in subsequent years. So, the first year you list Hardy first, because almost everyone gets in, even though you really prefer Latin.

Once you've secured your 6th grade spot at Hardy, you start lotterying for Latin every year. Now you can list Latin first every year and have a much better chance of getting in than families who have to hedge their bets because they can't afford to be shut out. The net result is that it takes you two or more years to finally get into Latin, the school you really wanted in the first place.

Furthermore, because risk-averse people like you did not list their true preference for Latin for 6th grade, many of those spots went to risk takers with other options, and many them opted for Deal or went private. As a result, some of those secretly-coveted Latin spots went to kids on the wait list, one or more of whom might actually have preferred Hardy to Latin, because, say, they want to attend Wilson, but drew a bad number in the lottery and got wait listed at both Hardy and Latin.

In short, because you kept your preference for Latin secret, you're at Hardy trying to get into Latin and someone else is at Latin trying to get into Hardy, and it will take you both two or more years to land at your preferred school, if ever. The result is a terrible misallocation of very scarce resources.

The only way to avoid this problem is not to penalize applicants for revealing their true preferences the first time around.

Excellent analysis. The salient point is that the proposed alternatives penalize applicants for revealing their true preference.

I'll add that the scenario the poster outlines -- "you're at Hardy trying to get into Latin and someone else is at Latin trying to get into Hardy" -- is not some theoretical outcome. It used to happen all the time before the common lottery. It even had a name -- the "September Shuffle" -- as schools would call kids off their waitlist late into September, which would open up spots at other schools, who would call kids off of their waitlist, and the cycle repeats. The whole system would roil and churn until count day. Ever wonder why DCPS waits until mid-October to count their students? With the common lottery we've gained essentially a month of instruction.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:
Expanding on PP's post, once you have a spot at some school, you're in a better position to shoot for the moon in subsequent years. So, the first year you list Hardy first, because almost everyone gets in, even though you really prefer Latin.

Once you've secured your 6th grade spot at Hardy, you start lotterying for Latin every year. Now you can list Latin first every year and have a much better chance of getting in than families who have to hedge their bets because they can't afford to be shut out. The net result is that it takes you two or more years to finally get into Latin, the school you really wanted in the first place.

Furthermore, because risk-averse people like you did not list their true preference for Latin for 6th grade, many of those spots went to risk takers with other options, and many them opted for Deal or went private. As a result, some of those secretly-coveted Latin spots went to kids on the wait list, one or more of whom might actually have preferred Hardy to Latin, because, say, they want to attend Wilson, but drew a bad number in the lottery and got wait listed at both Hardy and Latin.

In short, because you kept your preference for Latin secret, you're at Hardy trying to get into Latin and someone else is at Latin trying to get into Hardy, and it will take you both two or more years to land at your preferred school, if ever. The result is a terrible misallocation of very scarce resources.

The only way to avoid this problem is not to penalize applicants for revealing their true preferences the first time around.

Excellent analysis. The salient point is that the proposed alternatives penalize applicants for revealing their true preference.

I'll add that the scenario the poster outlines -- "you're at Hardy trying to get into Latin and someone else is at Latin trying to get into Hardy" -- is not some theoretical outcome. It used to happen all the time before the common lottery. It even had a name -- the "September Shuffle" -- as schools would call kids off their waitlist late into September, which would open up spots at other schools, who would call kids off of their waitlist, and the cycle repeats. The whole system would roil and churn until count day. Ever wonder why DCPS waits until mid-October to count their students? With the common lottery we've gained essentially a month of instruction.

The WL shuffle was something different -- b/c all the charters ran their own lotteries, people would get accepted at multiple schools; once they accepted one and declined the others, that opened up spaces for people on the WL. Whether the common lottery algorithm weights lottery number or ranking preference more heavily, as long as almost all the charters are participating in the common lottery, we won't go back to the churn of the old days.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

The WL shuffle was something different -- b/c all the charters ran their own lotteries, people would get accepted at multiple schools; once they accepted one and declined the others, that opened up spaces for people on the WL. Whether the common lottery algorithm weights lottery number or ranking preference more heavily, as long as almost all the charters are participating in the common lottery, we won't go back to the churn of the old days.

In a system where ranking preference is waited more heavily, mutually beneficial trades are possible. That's essentially what wait-list shuffle is, working out all the mutually beneficial trades.