Fairness of Common Lottery?

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:
Nooooo, under the "separate lotteries for each school within the common lottery" idea if you rank the school #1, you still have a better waitlist number for your #1 than anyone who ranked it lower. So first off, NO you do NOT have the equivalent of the worst number in the lottery, not by a longshot. Also, if you put safeties down that won't have a ton of people ranking it #1 (which happens now as well), you enter a separate lottery for everyone who ranked that school say #6, and it's entirely possible that if the people who ranked it higher don't chose it, you could still get in. That doesn't change from one system to another.

You still either get in or you don't, and if you don't get in you're screwed. If you're going to order the waitlist by ranking, if you don't get into your #1 it's going to be very hard to get into your #2, you're behind everyone who put it #1, and for each subsequent pick it gets harder and harder. Not getting your #1 is still tantamount to getting the last number in the lottery, you just have to wait until after the waitlist runs to learn that you're screwed.

You're right, I still don't get it. Because at the end of the day under the model I'm suggesting, the same finite number of spots at popular schools is filled, but it's filled with a higher number of people who ranked each school #1. And you still haven't explained why that isn't better, even if the person who puts "super popular school A" as #1 get shut out if they don't get in, at least overall more popular schools are filled with people who ranked that school #1. Because each school lottery begins with placing those who ranked each school #1. It's still the same number of spots, but an even higher % of #1 ranked choices are matched.

How is that not true?

[Anonymous]

I think the PPs are right that a weighted lottery would not bring back churn. It would be like the old days, but if you were only allowed to lottery for one tier one school (because no decent school would ever get down to the #2s). Does anyone really want that?

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:
2. On what are you basing this idea that a family would put their #2 choice first? Please give a specific scenario and reasons a family would do this, if you know you're probably opting out of your #1 if you don't rank it #1, explain to me the reasons that a family would put their #1 as #2? Especially if their #2 is very popular and will likely fill up with #1s?

When my kids were in fifth grade I put Deal #1 for sixth even though they said they weren't accepting any OOB kids. I figured if I get an excellent lottery number I'll be high on the waitlist, who knows what will happen, and it doesn't cost me anything. Under your proposal that would have been a very foolish thing to do, it would pretty much have prevented me from getting in anywhere unless I got into Deal. What if I had drawn #1 in the lottery? I'd have given up a chance for a spot at Deal.

Exactly, it would have been foolish. Why are you celebrating a system where you get rewarded because it didn't cost you anything? Why if you got #1 in the lottery and were waitlisted for Deal, why do you deserve whatever your #2 chioce was more than the family who ranked it #1 because they wanted to be at your #2 choice more than any other school?

Really, you just want a system where you can take risks over a system that better matches families that are serious about the school they rank #1 (because they have to be serious)? That is a major part of the problem right there.

[Anonymous]

The reason it wouldn't work is people would not put their true preference first. They would rank a school they thought they might be more likely to get into #1, rather than their true preference. This would be the "gaming" of the system.

I think the people who don't get it should read more about it before blithely suggest it is not a good system.

This allows people to make a list with their true preference.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:
2. On what are you basing this idea that a family would put their #2 choice first? Please give a specific scenario and reasons a family would do this, if you know you're probably opting out of your #1 if you don't rank it #1, explain to me the reasons that a family would put their #1 as #2? Especially if their #2 is very popular and will likely fill up with #1s?

When my kids were in fifth grade I put Deal #1 for sixth even though they said they weren't accepting any OOB kids. I figured if I get an excellent lottery number I'll be high on the waitlist, who knows what will happen, and it doesn't cost me anything. Under your proposal that would have been a very foolish thing to do, it would pretty much have prevented me from getting in anywhere unless I got into Deal. What if I had drawn #1 in the lottery? I'd have given up a chance for a spot at Deal.

Exactly, it would have been foolish. Why are you celebrating a system where you get rewarded because it didn't cost you anything? Why if you got #1 in the lottery and were waitlisted for Deal, why do you deserve whatever your #2 chioce was more than the family who ranked it #1 because they wanted to be at your #2 choice more than any other school?

Really, you just want a system where you can take risks over a system that better matches families that are serious about the school they rank #1 (because they have to be serious)? That is a major part of the problem right there.

But anyone can take the gamble on Deal. Under your system, only people who have a backup plan can even gamble on Deal.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:I think the PPs are right that a weighted lottery would not bring back churn. It would be like the old days, but if you were only allowed to lottery for one tier one school (because no decent school would ever get down to the #2s). Does anyone really want that?

Why would you not want it if it meant that at least for the few families who are lucky it's all families who wanted the school as #1 at each school? (And be clear, that # doesn't increase or decrease by either system; same # of slots, same greater # of families who want in.) Why is it better that some families can get their #3 choice because they got a better overall number, and take that spot from a family who ranked it #1 because it really was their first choice but they had a worse number? Why would you not rather be competing only against other families who ranked your #1 #1 as well, instead of families who ranked it all sorts of random ways but it's dependent on a single random number?

Same # of spots, but higher % filled with #1 ranked families. And still no one has pointed out how that is not true, or why the other way is better (except for the parent who wants to be able to take risks and not lose anything).

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:
Nooooo, under the "separate lotteries for each school within the common lottery" idea if you rank the school #1, you still have a better waitlist number for your #1 than anyone who ranked it lower. So first off, NO you do NOT have the equivalent of the worst number in the lottery, not by a longshot. Also, if you put safeties down that won't have a ton of people ranking it #1 (which happens now as well), you enter a separate lottery for everyone who ranked that school say #6, and it's entirely possible that if the people who ranked it higher don't chose it, you could still get in. That doesn't change from one system to another.

You still either get in or you don't, and if you don't get in you're screwed. If you're going to order the waitlist by ranking, if you don't get into your #1 it's going to be very hard to get into your #2, you're behind everyone who put it #1, and for each subsequent pick it gets harder and harder. Not getting your #1 is still tantamount to getting the last number in the lottery, you just have to wait until after the waitlist runs to learn that you're screwed.

You're right, I still don't get it. Because at the end of the day under the model I'm suggesting, the same finite number of spots at popular schools is filled, but it's filled with a higher number of people who ranked each school #1. And you still haven't explained why that isn't better, even if the person who puts "super popular school A" as #1 get shut out if they don't get in, at least overall more popular schools are filled with people who ranked that school #1. Because each school lottery begins with placing those who ranked each school #1. It's still the same number of spots, but an even higher % of #1 ranked choices are matched.

How is that not true?

Because most people will not be ranking schools according to their true preferences. Most will be ranking schools strategically to minimize their odds of being shut out completely. As a result, people with viable options outside of the lottery, and who can thus take the risk of being shut out, are the most likely to win spots at coveted schools. Second, risk-averse people will employ a multi-year strategy for getting into coveted schools. They will first lottery into a safety school and, having secured a spot, will then lottery for a spot at coveted year after year until they get in or give up.

The "September Shuffle" will turn into the "Middle School Shuffle" (and perhaps the "PK to 3rd Grade Shuffle") as people lock in their safety schools and slowly reveal their true preferences over a period of years.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:I think the PPs are right that a weighted lottery would not bring back churn. It would be like the old days, but if you were only allowed to lottery for one tier one school (because no decent school would ever get down to the #2s). Does anyone really want that?

Why would you not want it if it meant that at least for the few families who are lucky it's all families who wanted the school as #1 at each school? (And be clear, that # doesn't increase or decrease by either system; same # of slots, same greater # of families who want in.) Why is it better that some families can get their #3 choice because they got a better overall number, and take that spot from a family who ranked it #1 because it really was their first choice but they had a worse number? Why would you not rather be competing only against other families who ranked your #1 #1 as well, instead of families who ranked it all sorts of random ways but it's dependent on a single random number?

Same # of spots, but higher % filled with #1 ranked families. And still no one has pointed out how that is not true, or why the other way is better (except for the parent who wants to be able to take risks and not lose anything).

You mean, same # of spots, but higher % filled with #1 ranked families who actually gambled their entire lottery success on their #1 school. Please re-read some of the excellent and cogent summaries of what happens to families who don't get into their number 1 choice under your scenario. They are not only on the waiting list for Dream School A with scores of other Dream School #1s, but they are at the back of the waitlist for all the other schools they ranked behind people who ranked THOSE schools #1 (and then #2, etc.)

The current algorithm is designed to allow everyone to gamble on dream schools AND also hedge their bets by having safeties.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:I think the PPs are right that a weighted lottery would not bring back churn. It would be like the old days, but if you were only allowed to lottery for one tier one school (because no decent school would ever get down to the #2s). Does anyone really want that?

Why would you not want it if it meant that at least for the few families who are lucky it's all families who wanted the school as #1 at each school? (And be clear, that # doesn't increase or decrease by either system; same # of slots, same greater # of families who want in.) Why is it better that some families can get their #3 choice because they got a better overall number, and take that spot from a family who ranked it #1 because it really was their first choice but they had a worse number? Why would you not rather be competing only against other families who ranked your #1 #1 as well, instead of families who ranked it all sorts of random ways but it's dependent on a single random number?

Same # of spots, but higher % filled with #1 ranked families. And still no one has pointed out how that is not true, or why the other way is better (except for the parent who wants to be able to take risks and not lose anything).

You mean, same # of spots, but higher % filled with #1 ranked families who actually gambled their entire lottery success on their #1 school. Please re-read some of the excellent and cogent summaries of what happens to families who don't get into their number 1 choice under your scenario. They are not only on the waiting list for Dream School A with scores of other Dream School #1s, but they are at the back of the waitlist for all the other schools they ranked behind people who ranked THOSE schools #1 (and then #2, etc.)

The current algorithm is designed to allow everyone to gamble on dream schools AND also hedge their bets by having safeties.

Families with other choices are still playing the lottery and only opting for 1 or 2 schools, basically the only ones they'd consider. How does only allowing those who rank it #1 somehow increase the pool of those families? They are already doing this, and they can still under the current system only apply to 2 schools, get a great number, and take that slot away from a family who wanted the school more. AND if they apply to 2 schools and get into #2, they can still under the current system take that school slot away from someone else who ranked it #1 but got an overall horrible number.

I'm actually fine with accepting that I may be totally in the minority of thinking this is possible and should be explored. But I leave this conversation pointing out that still NO ONE has shown how somehow families are taking other things into consideration in the proposed system of individual lotteries by ranking than in the current system. I know many families throwing impossible schools int he mix, but some do it at the top of their list, some in the middle, some at the end as a way to fill out the 12. Still don't understand why that is better than starting each school with lotteries of #1 picks, but definitely still sure it's a fallacy that somehow people aren't being "strategic" in the current system. It is ALL about strategy, even if not everyone agrees on what the best strategy is. If you doubt this, you have pages and pages of threads on exactly this (what schools and how they ranked them) here on DCUM.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

The WL shuffle was something different -- b/c all the charters ran their own lotteries, people would get accepted at multiple schools; once they accepted one and declined the others, that opened up spaces for people on the WL. Whether the common lottery algorithm weights lottery number or ranking preference more heavily, as long as almost all the charters are participating in the common lottery, we won't go back to the churn of the old days.

In a system where ranking preference is waited more heavily, mutually beneficial trades are possible. That's essentially what wait-list shuffle is, working out all the mutually beneficial trades.

But practically speaking, those trades can't actually occur, even if they would be mutually beneficial -- two families can't just meet and agree to swap, both families would have to be at/near the top of the other school's waitlist, and one family would have to turn down an actual spot in favor of the spot they assume would materialize after the other family moved off the waitlist into their spot.

So even if mutually beneficially trades are theoretically possible, there won't actually be any trading/churn.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

The WL shuffle was something different -- b/c all the charters ran their own lotteries, people would get accepted at multiple schools; once they accepted one and declined the others, that opened up spaces for people on the WL. Whether the common lottery algorithm weights lottery number or ranking preference more heavily, as long as almost all the charters are participating in the common lottery, we won't go back to the churn of the old days.

In a system where ranking preference is waited more heavily, mutually beneficial trades are possible. That's essentially what wait-list shuffle is, working out all the mutually beneficial trades.

But practically speaking, those trades can't actually occur, even if they would be mutually beneficial -- two families can't just meet and agree to swap, both families would have to be at/near the top of the other school's waitlist, and one family would have to turn down an actual spot in favor of the spot they assume would materialize after the other family moved off the waitlist into their spot.

So even if mutually beneficially trades are theoretically possible, there won't actually be any trading/churn.

The trades don't have to happen as trades per se. If there is one kid at each school who is also on the waitlist at the other school, if a spot opens up at either school both kids move -- when one moves he opens a spot for the other, who then moves -- and opens a spot for someone else. If there are lots of kids on the waitlist it still only takes one spot at one school for a whole lot of kids to move. This is what used to happen in the bad old days. Spots always open up, there were tens of thousands of kids on waitlists, one move means lots of kids move.

My old elementary school didn't even start taking attendance until into September.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:I think the PPs are right that a weighted lottery would not bring back churn. It would be like the old days, but if you were only allowed to lottery for one tier one school (because no decent school would ever get down to the #2s). Does anyone really want that?

Why would you not want it if it meant that at least for the few families who are lucky it's all families who wanted the school as #1 at each school? (And be clear, that # doesn't increase or decrease by either system; same # of slots, same greater # of families who want in.) Why is it better that some families can get their #3 choice because they got a better overall number, and take that spot from a family who ranked it #1 because it really was their first choice but they had a worse number? Why would you not rather be competing only against other families who ranked your #1 #1 as well, instead of families who ranked it all sorts of random ways but it's dependent on a single random number?

Same # of spots, but higher % filled with #1 ranked families. And still no one has pointed out how that is not true, or why the other way is better (except for the parent who wants to be able to take risks and not lose anything).

You mean, same # of spots, but higher % filled with #1 ranked families who actually gambled their entire lottery success on their #1 school. Please re-read some of the excellent and cogent summaries of what happens to families who don't get into their number 1 choice under your scenario. They are not only on the waiting list for Dream School A with scores of other Dream School #1s, but they are at the back of the waitlist for all the other schools they ranked behind people who ranked THOSE schools #1 (and then #2, etc.)

The current algorithm is designed to allow everyone to gamble on dream schools AND also hedge their bets by having safeties.

Families with other choices are still playing the lottery and only opting for 1 or 2 schools, basically the only ones they'd consider. How does only allowing those who rank it #1 somehow increase the pool of those families? They are already doing this, and they can still under the current system only apply to 2 schools, get a great number, and take that slot away from a family who wanted the school more. AND if they apply to 2 schools and get into #2, they can still under the current system take that school slot away from someone else who ranked it #1 but got an overall horrible number.

I'm actually fine with accepting that I may be totally in the minority of thinking this is possible and should be explored. But I leave this conversation pointing out that still NO ONE has shown how somehow families are taking other things into consideration in the proposed system of individual lotteries by ranking than in the current system. I know many families throwing impossible schools int he mix, but some do it at the top of their list, some in the middle, some at the end as a way to fill out the 12. Still don't understand why that is better than starting each school with lotteries of #1 picks, but definitely still sure it's a fallacy that somehow people aren't being "strategic" in the current system. It is ALL about strategy, even if not everyone agrees on what the best strategy is. If you doubt this, you have pages and pages of threads on exactly this (what schools and how they ranked them) here on DCUM.

Do you get that under your proposal there is a huge penalty for putting a school #1 and not getting into it?

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:I think the PPs are right that a weighted lottery would not bring back churn. It would be like the old days, but if you were only allowed to lottery for one tier one school (because no decent school would ever get down to the #2s). Does anyone really want that?

Why would you not want it if it meant that at least for the few families who are lucky it's all families who wanted the school as #1 at each school? (And be clear, that # doesn't increase or decrease by either system; same # of slots, same greater # of families who want in.) Why is it better that some families can get their #3 choice because they got a better overall number, and take that spot from a family who ranked it #1 because it really was their first choice but they had a worse number? Why would you not rather be competing only against other families who ranked your #1 #1 as well, instead of families who ranked it all sorts of random ways but it's dependent on a single random number?

Same # of spots, but higher % filled with #1 ranked families. And still no one has pointed out how that is not true, or why the other way is better (except for the parent who wants to be able to take risks and not lose anything).

Ranking a school #1 doesn't necessarily mean you want to go there. For a good school, it means you have good enough other options to be confident enough to potentially waste your lottery chance on it.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:I think the PPs are right that a weighted lottery would not bring back churn. It would be like the old days, but if you were only allowed to lottery for one tier one school (because no decent school would ever get down to the #2s). Does anyone really want that?

Why would you not want it if it meant that at least for the few families who are lucky it's all families who wanted the school as #1 at each school? (And be clear, that # doesn't increase or decrease by either system; same # of slots, same greater # of families who want in.) Why is it better that some families can get their #3 choice because they got a better overall number, and take that spot from a family who ranked it #1 because it really was their first choice but they had a worse number? Why would you not rather be competing only against other families who ranked your #1 #1 as well, instead of families who ranked it all sorts of random ways but it's dependent on a single random number?

Same # of spots, but higher % filled with #1 ranked families. And still no one has pointed out how that is not true, or why the other way is better (except for the parent who wants to be able to take risks and not lose anything).

You mean, same # of spots, but higher % filled with #1 ranked families who actually gambled their entire lottery success on their #1 school. Please re-read some of the excellent and cogent summaries of what happens to families who don't get into their number 1 choice under your scenario. They are not only on the waiting list for Dream School A with scores of other Dream School #1s, but they are at the back of the waitlist for all the other schools they ranked behind people who ranked THOSE schools #1 (and then #2, etc.)

The current algorithm is designed to allow everyone to gamble on dream schools AND also hedge their bets by having safeties.

Families with other choices are still playing the lottery and only opting for 1 or 2 schools, basically the only ones they'd consider. How does only allowing those who rank it #1 somehow increase the pool of those families? They are already doing this, and they can still under the current system only apply to 2 schools, get a great number, and take that slot away from a family who wanted the school more. AND if they apply to 2 schools and get into #2, they can still under the current system take that school slot away from someone else who ranked it #1 but got an overall horrible number.

I'm actually fine with accepting that I may be totally in the minority of thinking this is possible and should be explored. But I leave this conversation pointing out that still NO ONE has shown how somehow families are taking other things into consideration in the proposed system of individual lotteries by ranking than in the current system. I know many families throwing impossible schools int he mix, but some do it at the top of their list, some in the middle, some at the end as a way to fill out the 12. Still don't understand why that is better than starting each school with lotteries of #1 picks, but definitely still sure it's a fallacy that somehow people aren't being "strategic" in the current system. It is ALL about strategy, even if not everyone agrees on what the best strategy is. If you doubt this, you have pages and pages of threads on exactly this (what schools and how they ranked them) here on DCUM.

Your lottery of #1 is a horrible idea if you think about how that would actually play out at a school that had 300 applicants for 10 slots. Even if the waitlist went to 20, what do you think is going to happen to the other 280 families who ranked that school as number 1? They are going to be waitlisted at their number 2 school, but behind the 120 people who ranked that school number 1, and mixed in with all the other people who didn't get into their number 1 schools. Eventually there will be more matches wayyyyyy down the lists as people's lower-ranked school choices start to diverge.

Nobody is arguing that there isn't some element of strategy in the current system, at least as far as strategy means "understanding how the algorithm works." Because anyone who put their dream schools at the bottom of their lists wasn't being strategic; they were being uninformed. Same goes for people who only put dream schools and didn't opt for any safeties. Knowing what good safeties might be definitely required some information gathering, which I suppose you could define as strategy. But all of these are very different from the strategy that would be needed in your separate lottery scenario (see the posts above about hidden preference).

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:
Nooooo, under the "separate lotteries for each school within the common lottery" idea if you rank the school #1, you still have a better waitlist number for your #1 than anyone who ranked it lower. So first off, NO you do NOT have the equivalent of the worst number in the lottery, not by a longshot. Also, if you put safeties down that won't have a ton of people ranking it #1 (which happens now as well), you enter a separate lottery for everyone who ranked that school say #6, and it's entirely possible that if the people who ranked it higher don't chose it, you could still get in. That doesn't change from one system to another.

You still either get in or you don't, and if you don't get in you're screwed. If you're going to order the waitlist by ranking, if you don't get into your #1 it's going to be very hard to get into your #2, you're behind everyone who put it #1, and for each subsequent pick it gets harder and harder. Not getting your #1 is still tantamount to getting the last number in the lottery, you just have to wait until after the waitlist runs to learn that you're screwed.

You're right, I still don't get it. Because at the end of the day under the model I'm suggesting, the same finite number of spots at popular schools is filled, but it's filled with a higher number of people who ranked each school #1. And you still haven't explained why that isn't better, even if the person who puts "super popular school A" as #1 get shut out if they don't get in, at least overall more popular schools are filled with people who ranked that school #1. Because each school lottery begins with placing those who ranked each school #1. It's still the same number of spots, but an even higher % of #1 ranked choices are matched.

How is that not true?

Because most people will not be ranking schools according to their true preferences. Most will be ranking schools strategically to minimize their odds of being shut out completely. As a result, people with viable options outside of the lottery, and who can thus take the risk of being shut out, are the most likely to win spots at coveted schools. Second, risk-averse people will employ a multi-year strategy for getting into coveted schools. They will first lottery into a safety school and, having secured a spot, will then lottery for a spot at coveted year after year until they get in or give up.

The "September Shuffle" will turn into the "Middle School Shuffle" (and perhaps the "PK to 3rd Grade Shuffle") as people lock in their safety schools and slowly reveal their true preferences over a period of years.

Pp, you are 100 percent right. Schools would not be able to build a sense of community because there would be huge "trade up" churn. This wouldn't be good for schools or kids. And only rich families with decent in bounds options would be able to afford a long shot bet. So Yu Ying and Mundo Verde PK3 and PK4 would be filled with kids from Nw and other rich areas. Kids from poorer areas would filter in in K through second grade and have a harder time catching up with their richer peers.