Potomac Yard (Alexandria) HOA — Issues?

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:As a retired lawyer, here’s my take, based on a very quick read. First, the complaint undercuts its own ultra‑vires theory. It reproduces the Declaration language giving the Association “the right, but not the obligation, to assign and reserve parking spaces for the exclusive use of individual Owners,” then immediately alleges the Declaration is silent on unequal parking assignments. The quoted clause is an express grant of discretion that contradicts the claim of silence. Yet plaintiffs proceed as though the clause does not exist, insisting that nothing “expressly provides otherwise,” a statement flatly inconsistent with their own quotation.

Their reliance on Manchester Oaks, Telegraph Square and White is also misplaced. Those decisions limit an association only where the governing instrument contains no provision on the contested power. Because the Declaration here squarely authorizes exclusive parking assignments, the cases do not apply; the complaint never confronts this dispositive distinction.

The pleading also assumes a contractual right to proportional access to common‑area parking. The Declaration creates no such right; it merely imposes a duty to pay assessments for upkeep of the common area. Owners who chose two‑car‑garage homes inherently need fewer street spaces, and the allocation of forty‑six of fifty‑two spaces to non‑garage lots is rational on its face.

On the architectural claims, plaintiffs portray Sections 6.03 and 6.06 as vague “general design‑control provisions,” but Section 6.03 contains a concrete prohibition: “no Structure shall be painted, stuccoed or surfaced with any material unless and until approved in writing” under committee guidelines. Far from vague, it is a textbook example of an express covenant conditioning exterior changes on prior approval.

The complaint further ignores the Declaration’s expansive definition of “Structure,” which covers “any thing or object … the placement of which upon any Lot may affect the appearance of such Lot,” sweeping in bird feeders, string lights, flags and colored bulbs—the very items for which the Association imposed fines. Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that Section 6.03 “provides no guidance whatsoever,” a characterization belied by the detailed language they quote.

Plaintiffs assert that any rules adopted after their purchase are unenforceable because they were not recorded, but Section 5.07 and Virginia Code 55.1‑1819 expressly empower the Board to promulgate reasonable design rules without recordation. The statute’s default authority defeats the recording argument.

The fines claim is pled in purely conclusory terms: the complaint alleges only that debits and credits “appeared” on monthly ledgers, without dates, amounts, notice, or hearing details. Absent factual particulars tying each fine to a specific violation and demonstrating procedural due process, the claim cannot survive dismissal.

Procedurally, the plaintiffs request sweeping injunctive relief despite having an adequate remedy at law—refund of any improper fines and reassignment of parking if warranted. They also omit allegations that they satisfied the POA Act’s prerequisite of a written final adverse decision and a 30‑day settlement window before suing for attorney fees. Statutory miscitation of repealed sections and shotgun pleading of multiple theories in a single count further expose the complaint to dismissal.

Taken together, the Declaration provisions quoted by plaintiffs undermine their key theories; their legal authorities are inapposite; factual allegations about fines and notice are thin; and statutory prerequisites are absent.

Plaintiffs will LOSE. Bigly.

This must be Deacon Gary Bockweg. It sounds 100% like him. The word of "God".

Gary Bockweg remember when you posted on Nextdoor how these were your parking spots ? The word of "God".

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:As a retired lawyer, here’s my take, based on a very quick read. First, the complaint undercuts its own ultra‑vires theory. It reproduces the Declaration language giving the Association “the right, but not the obligation, to assign and reserve parking spaces for the exclusive use of individual Owners,” then immediately alleges the Declaration is silent on unequal parking assignments. The quoted clause is an express grant of discretion that contradicts the claim of silence. Yet plaintiffs proceed as though the clause does not exist, insisting that nothing “expressly provides otherwise,” a statement flatly inconsistent with their own quotation.

Their reliance on Manchester Oaks, Telegraph Square and White is also misplaced. Those decisions limit an association only where the governing instrument contains no provision on the contested power. Because the Declaration here squarely authorizes exclusive parking assignments, the cases do not apply; the complaint never confronts this dispositive distinction.

The pleading also assumes a contractual right to proportional access to common‑area parking. The Declaration creates no such right; it merely imposes a duty to pay assessments for upkeep of the common area. Owners who chose two‑car‑garage homes inherently need fewer street spaces, and the allocation of forty‑six of fifty‑two spaces to non‑garage lots is rational on its face.

On the architectural claims, plaintiffs portray Sections 6.03 and 6.06 as vague “general design‑control provisions,” but Section 6.03 contains a concrete prohibition: “no Structure shall be painted, stuccoed or surfaced with any material unless and until approved in writing” under committee guidelines. Far from vague, it is a textbook example of an express covenant conditioning exterior changes on prior approval.

The complaint further ignores the Declaration’s expansive definition of “Structure,” which covers “any thing or object … the placement of which upon any Lot may affect the appearance of such Lot,” sweeping in bird feeders, string lights, flags and colored bulbs—the very items for which the Association imposed fines. Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that Section 6.03 “provides no guidance whatsoever,” a characterization belied by the detailed language they quote.

Plaintiffs assert that any rules adopted after their purchase are unenforceable because they were not recorded, but Section 5.07 and Virginia Code 55.1‑1819 expressly empower the Board to promulgate reasonable design rules without recordation. The statute’s default authority defeats the recording argument.

The fines claim is pled in purely conclusory terms: the complaint alleges only that debits and credits “appeared” on monthly ledgers, without dates, amounts, notice, or hearing details. Absent factual particulars tying each fine to a specific violation and demonstrating procedural due process, the claim cannot survive dismissal.

Procedurally, the plaintiffs request sweeping injunctive relief despite having an adequate remedy at law—refund of any improper fines and reassignment of parking if warranted. They also omit allegations that they satisfied the POA Act’s prerequisite of a written final adverse decision and a 30‑day settlement window before suing for attorney fees. Statutory miscitation of repealed sections and shotgun pleading of multiple theories in a single count further expose the complaint to dismissal.

Taken together, the Declaration provisions quoted by plaintiffs undermine their key theories; their legal authorities are inapposite; factual allegations about fines and notice are thin; and statutory prerequisites are absent.

Plaintiffs will LOSE. Bigly.

Can you post a parking case you have won where the court ruled a HOA can deny members access to a common area ? Are you an ungarage town home owner on Van Valkenburgh lane ?

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:As a retired lawyer, here’s my take, based on a very quick read. First, the complaint undercuts its own ultra‑vires theory. It reproduces the Declaration language giving the Association “the right, but not the obligation, to assign and reserve parking spaces for the exclusive use of individual Owners,” then immediately alleges the Declaration is silent on unequal parking assignments. The quoted clause is an express grant of discretion that contradicts the claim of silence. Yet plaintiffs proceed as though the clause does not exist, insisting that nothing “expressly provides otherwise,” a statement flatly inconsistent with their own quotation.

Their reliance on Manchester Oaks, Telegraph Square and White is also misplaced. Those decisions limit an association only where the governing instrument contains no provision on the contested power. Because the Declaration here squarely authorizes exclusive parking assignments, the cases do not apply; the complaint never confronts this dispositive distinction.

The pleading also assumes a contractual right to proportional access to common‑area parking. The Declaration creates no such right; it merely imposes a duty to pay assessments for upkeep of the common area. Owners who chose two‑car‑garage homes inherently need fewer street spaces, and the allocation of forty‑six of fifty‑two spaces to non‑garage lots is rational on its face.

On the architectural claims, plaintiffs portray Sections 6.03 and 6.06 as vague “general design‑control provisions,” but Section 6.03 contains a concrete prohibition: “no Structure shall be painted, stuccoed or surfaced with any material unless and until approved in writing” under committee guidelines. Far from vague, it is a textbook example of an express covenant conditioning exterior changes on prior approval.

The complaint further ignores the Declaration’s expansive definition of “Structure,” which covers “any thing or object … the placement of which upon any Lot may affect the appearance of such Lot,” sweeping in bird feeders, string lights, flags and colored bulbs—the very items for which the Association imposed fines. Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that Section 6.03 “provides no guidance whatsoever,” a characterization belied by the detailed language they quote.

Plaintiffs assert that any rules adopted after their purchase are unenforceable because they were not recorded, but Section 5.07 and Virginia Code 55.1‑1819 expressly empower the Board to promulgate reasonable design rules without recordation. The statute’s default authority defeats the recording argument.

The fines claim is pled in purely conclusory terms: the complaint alleges only that debits and credits “appeared” on monthly ledgers, without dates, amounts, notice, or hearing details. Absent factual particulars tying each fine to a specific violation and demonstrating procedural due process, the claim cannot survive dismissal.

Procedurally, the plaintiffs request sweeping injunctive relief despite having an adequate remedy at law—refund of any improper fines and reassignment of parking if warranted. They also omit allegations that they satisfied the POA Act’s prerequisite of a written final adverse decision and a 30‑day settlement window before suing for attorney fees. Statutory miscitation of repealed sections and shotgun pleading of multiple theories in a single count further expose the complaint to dismissal.

Taken together, the Declaration provisions quoted by plaintiffs undermine their key theories; their legal authorities are inapposite; factual allegations about fines and notice are thin; and statutory prerequisites are absent.

Plaintiffs will LOSE. Bigly.

You have a lot to say, but don't seem to have much background in HOA law. If maintenance is paid by all members, it is common area and no member can be excluded from using it. The HOA board cannot grant an exclusive license to only certain members to use common property. As for structures - it actually has to be a structure, which is something permanently affixed to real property. The VSC in Sainani rightfully states that restrictive covenants have to be constructed narrowly and the law is on the side of the homeowner and free use of property. During oral argument, one of the justices gave the example of a welcome plaque, which the HOA lawyer said would require HOA approval. The judge found that to be ridiculous. The court also said restrictions have to be reasonable. Here are some relevant paragraphs from Sainani. I recommend you read this opinion as well as the parking lot cases.

The proper construction of restrictive covenants is a question of law that we review de novo. See Fein v. Payandeh, 284 Va. 599, 605, 734 S.E.2d 655 (2012). As we recently observed, "in keeping with our common-law traditions, Virginia courts have consistently applied the principle of strict construction to restrictive covenants." Tvardek v. Powhatan Village Homeowners Ass'n, 291 Va. 269, 275 & n.2, 784 S.E.2d 280 (2016) (collecting cases). Underlying this principle of strict construction is the common-law premise that the "absolute right" to property "consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all [one's] acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land." 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *138; see Hamm v. Hazelwood, 292 Va. 153, 157-58, 787 S.E.2d 144 (2016).

With this common-law underpinning, "the general rule" is that restrictive covenants "are not favored, and the burden is on [the party] who would enforce such covenants to establish that the activity objected to is within their terms." Scott v. Walker, 274 Va. 209, 212-13, 645 S.E.2d 278 (2007) (citation omitted). Restrictive covenants "are to be construed most strictly against the grantor and persons seeking to enforce them, and substantial doubt or ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the free use of property and against restrictions." Id. at 213, 645 S.E.2d 278 (citation omitted). Virginia courts should "enforce restrictive covenants where the intention of the parties is clear and the restrictions are reasonable" and "if it is apparent from a reading of the whole instrument that the restrictions carry a certain meaning by definite and necessary implication." Shepherd v. Conde, 293 Va. 274, 288, 797 S.E.2d 750 (2017) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:As a retired lawyer, here’s my take, based on a very quick read. First, the complaint undercuts its own ultra‑vires theory. It reproduces the Declaration language giving the Association “the right, but not the obligation, to assign and reserve parking spaces for the exclusive use of individual Owners,” then immediately alleges the Declaration is silent on unequal parking assignments. The quoted clause is an express grant of discretion that contradicts the claim of silence. Yet plaintiffs proceed as though the clause does not exist, insisting that nothing “expressly provides otherwise,” a statement flatly inconsistent with their own quotation.

Their reliance on Manchester Oaks, Telegraph Square and White is also misplaced. Those decisions limit an association only where the governing instrument contains no provision on the contested power. Because the Declaration here squarely authorizes exclusive parking assignments, the cases do not apply; the complaint never confronts this dispositive distinction.

The pleading also assumes a contractual right to proportional access to common‑area parking. The Declaration creates no such right; it merely imposes a duty to pay assessments for upkeep of the common area. Owners who chose two‑car‑garage homes inherently need fewer street spaces, and the allocation of forty‑six of fifty‑two spaces to non‑garage lots is rational on its face.

On the architectural claims, plaintiffs portray Sections 6.03 and 6.06 as vague “general design‑control provisions,” but Section 6.03 contains a concrete prohibition: “no Structure shall be painted, stuccoed or surfaced with any material unless and until approved in writing” under committee guidelines. Far from vague, it is a textbook example of an express covenant conditioning exterior changes on prior approval.

The complaint further ignores the Declaration’s expansive definition of “Structure,” which covers “any thing or object … the placement of which upon any Lot may affect the appearance of such Lot,” sweeping in bird feeders, string lights, flags and colored bulbs—the very items for which the Association imposed fines. Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that Section 6.03 “provides no guidance whatsoever,” a characterization belied by the detailed language they quote.

Plaintiffs assert that any rules adopted after their purchase are unenforceable because they were not recorded, but Section 5.07 and Virginia Code 55.1‑1819 expressly empower the Board to promulgate reasonable design rules without recordation. The statute’s default authority defeats the recording argument.

The fines claim is pled in purely conclusory terms: the complaint alleges only that debits and credits “appeared” on monthly ledgers, without dates, amounts, notice, or hearing details. Absent factual particulars tying each fine to a specific violation and demonstrating procedural due process, the claim cannot survive dismissal.

Procedurally, the plaintiffs request sweeping injunctive relief despite having an adequate remedy at law—refund of any improper fines and reassignment of parking if warranted. They also omit allegations that they satisfied the POA Act’s prerequisite of a written final adverse decision and a 30‑day settlement window before suing for attorney fees. Statutory miscitation of repealed sections and shotgun pleading of multiple theories in a single count further expose the complaint to dismissal.

Taken together, the Declaration provisions quoted by plaintiffs undermine their key theories; their legal authorities are inapposite; factual allegations about fines and notice are thin; and statutory prerequisites are absent.

Plaintiffs will LOSE. Bigly.

You have a lot to say, but don't seem to have much background in HOA law. If maintenance is paid by all members, it is common area and no member can be excluded from using it. The HOA board cannot grant an exclusive license to only certain members to use common property. As for structures - it actually has to be a structure, which is something permanently affixed to real property. The VSC in Sainani rightfully states that restrictive covenants have to be constructed narrowly and the law is on the side of the homeowner and free use of property. During oral argument, one of the justices gave the example of a welcome plaque, which the HOA lawyer said would require HOA approval. The judge found that to be ridiculous. The court also said restrictions have to be reasonable. Here are some relevant paragraphs from Sainani. I recommend you read this opinion as well as the parking lot cases.

The proper construction of restrictive covenants is a question of law that we review de novo. See Fein v. Payandeh, 284 Va. 599, 605, 734 S.E.2d 655 (2012). As we recently observed, "in keeping with our common-law traditions, Virginia courts have consistently applied the principle of strict construction to restrictive covenants." Tvardek v. Powhatan Village Homeowners Ass'n, 291 Va. 269, 275 & n.2, 784 S.E.2d 280 (2016) (collecting cases). Underlying this principle of strict construction is the common-law premise that the "absolute right" to property "consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all [one's] acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land." 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *138; see Hamm v. Hazelwood, 292 Va. 153, 157-58, 787 S.E.2d 144 (2016).

With this common-law underpinning, "the general rule" is that restrictive covenants "are not favored, and the burden is on [the party] who would enforce such covenants to establish that the activity objected to is within their terms." Scott v. Walker, 274 Va. 209, 212-13, 645 S.E.2d 278 (2007) (citation omitted). Restrictive covenants "are to be construed most strictly against the grantor and persons seeking to enforce them, and substantial doubt or ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the free use of property and against restrictions." Id. at 213, 645 S.E.2d 278 (citation omitted). Virginia courts should "enforce restrictive covenants where the intention of the parties is clear and the restrictions are reasonable" and "if it is apparent from a reading of the whole instrument that the restrictions carry a certain meaning by definite and necessary implication." Shepherd v. Conde, 293 Va. 274, 288, 797 S.E.2d 750 (2017) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Note how you continue to rehash and babble on about your same defective idiotic arguments but don’t address anything I said. Probably bc you can’t.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:As a retired lawyer, here’s my take, based on a very quick read. First, the complaint undercuts its own ultra‑vires theory. It reproduces the Declaration language giving the Association “the right, but not the obligation, to assign and reserve parking spaces for the exclusive use of individual Owners,” then immediately alleges the Declaration is silent on unequal parking assignments. The quoted clause is an express grant of discretion that contradicts the claim of silence. Yet plaintiffs proceed as though the clause does not exist, insisting that nothing “expressly provides otherwise,” a statement flatly inconsistent with their own quotation.

Their reliance on Manchester Oaks, Telegraph Square and White is also misplaced. Those decisions limit an association only where the governing instrument contains no provision on the contested power. Because the Declaration here squarely authorizes exclusive parking assignments, the cases do not apply; the complaint never confronts this dispositive distinction.

The pleading also assumes a contractual right to proportional access to common‑area parking. The Declaration creates no such right; it merely imposes a duty to pay assessments for upkeep of the common area. Owners who chose two‑car‑garage homes inherently need fewer street spaces, and the allocation of forty‑six of fifty‑two spaces to non‑garage lots is rational on its face.

On the architectural claims, plaintiffs portray Sections 6.03 and 6.06 as vague “general design‑control provisions,” but Section 6.03 contains a concrete prohibition: “no Structure shall be painted, stuccoed or surfaced with any material unless and until approved in writing” under committee guidelines. Far from vague, it is a textbook example of an express covenant conditioning exterior changes on prior approval.

The complaint further ignores the Declaration’s expansive definition of “Structure,” which covers “any thing or object … the placement of which upon any Lot may affect the appearance of such Lot,” sweeping in bird feeders, string lights, flags and colored bulbs—the very items for which the Association imposed fines. Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that Section 6.03 “provides no guidance whatsoever,” a characterization belied by the detailed language they quote.

Plaintiffs assert that any rules adopted after their purchase are unenforceable because they were not recorded, but Section 5.07 and Virginia Code 55.1‑1819 expressly empower the Board to promulgate reasonable design rules without recordation. The statute’s default authority defeats the recording argument.

The fines claim is pled in purely conclusory terms: the complaint alleges only that debits and credits “appeared” on monthly ledgers, without dates, amounts, notice, or hearing details. Absent factual particulars tying each fine to a specific violation and demonstrating procedural due process, the claim cannot survive dismissal.

Procedurally, the plaintiffs request sweeping injunctive relief despite having an adequate remedy at law—refund of any improper fines and reassignment of parking if warranted. They also omit allegations that they satisfied the POA Act’s prerequisite of a written final adverse decision and a 30‑day settlement window before suing for attorney fees. Statutory miscitation of repealed sections and shotgun pleading of multiple theories in a single count further expose the complaint to dismissal.

Taken together, the Declaration provisions quoted by plaintiffs undermine their key theories; their legal authorities are inapposite; factual allegations about fines and notice are thin; and statutory prerequisites are absent.

Plaintiffs will LOSE. Bigly.

The HOA is going to rip this silly case to shreds in court. And make Francis pay all fees.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:As a retired lawyer, here’s my take, based on a very quick read. First, the complaint undercuts its own ultra‑vires theory. It reproduces the Declaration language giving the Association “the right, but not the obligation, to assign and reserve parking spaces for the exclusive use of individual Owners,” then immediately alleges the Declaration is silent on unequal parking assignments. The quoted clause is an express grant of discretion that contradicts the claim of silence. Yet plaintiffs proceed as though the clause does not exist, insisting that nothing “expressly provides otherwise,” a statement flatly inconsistent with their own quotation.

Their reliance on Manchester Oaks, Telegraph Square and White is also misplaced. Those decisions limit an association only where the governing instrument contains no provision on the contested power. Because the Declaration here squarely authorizes exclusive parking assignments, the cases do not apply; the complaint never confronts this dispositive distinction.

The pleading also assumes a contractual right to proportional access to common‑area parking. The Declaration creates no such right; it merely imposes a duty to pay assessments for upkeep of the common area. Owners who chose two‑car‑garage homes inherently need fewer street spaces, and the allocation of forty‑six of fifty‑two spaces to non‑garage lots is rational on its face.

On the architectural claims, plaintiffs portray Sections 6.03 and 6.06 as vague “general design‑control provisions,” but Section 6.03 contains a concrete prohibition: “no Structure shall be painted, stuccoed or surfaced with any material unless and until approved in writing” under committee guidelines. Far from vague, it is a textbook example of an express covenant conditioning exterior changes on prior approval.

The complaint further ignores the Declaration’s expansive definition of “Structure,” which covers “any thing or object … the placement of which upon any Lot may affect the appearance of such Lot,” sweeping in bird feeders, string lights, flags and colored bulbs—the very items for which the Association imposed fines. Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that Section 6.03 “provides no guidance whatsoever,” a characterization belied by the detailed language they quote.

Plaintiffs assert that any rules adopted after their purchase are unenforceable because they were not recorded, but Section 5.07 and Virginia Code 55.1‑1819 expressly empower the Board to promulgate reasonable design rules without recordation. The statute’s default authority defeats the recording argument.

The fines claim is pled in purely conclusory terms: the complaint alleges only that debits and credits “appeared” on monthly ledgers, without dates, amounts, notice, or hearing details. Absent factual particulars tying each fine to a specific violation and demonstrating procedural due process, the claim cannot survive dismissal.

Procedurally, the plaintiffs request sweeping injunctive relief despite having an adequate remedy at law—refund of any improper fines and reassignment of parking if warranted. They also omit allegations that they satisfied the POA Act’s prerequisite of a written final adverse decision and a 30‑day settlement window before suing for attorney fees. Statutory miscitation of repealed sections and shotgun pleading of multiple theories in a single count further expose the complaint to dismissal.

Taken together, the Declaration provisions quoted by plaintiffs undermine their key theories; their legal authorities are inapposite; factual allegations about fines and notice are thin; and statutory prerequisites are absent.

Plaintiffs will LOSE. Bigly.

You have a lot to say, but don't seem to have much background in HOA law. If maintenance is paid by all members, it is common area and no member can be excluded from using it. The HOA board cannot grant an exclusive license to only certain members to use common property. As for structures - it actually has to be a structure, which is something permanently affixed to real property. The VSC in Sainani rightfully states that restrictive covenants have to be constructed narrowly and the law is on the side of the homeowner and free use of property. During oral argument, one of the justices gave the example of a welcome plaque, which the HOA lawyer said would require HOA approval. The judge found that to be ridiculous. The court also said restrictions have to be reasonable. Here are some relevant paragraphs from Sainani. I recommend you read this opinion as well as the parking lot cases.

The proper construction of restrictive covenants is a question of law that we review de novo. See Fein v. Payandeh, 284 Va. 599, 605, 734 S.E.2d 655 (2012). As we recently observed, "in keeping with our common-law traditions, Virginia courts have consistently applied the principle of strict construction to restrictive covenants." Tvardek v. Powhatan Village Homeowners Ass'n, 291 Va. 269, 275 & n.2, 784 S.E.2d 280 (2016) (collecting cases). Underlying this principle of strict construction is the common-law premise that the "absolute right" to property "consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all [one's] acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land." 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *138; see Hamm v. Hazelwood, 292 Va. 153, 157-58, 787 S.E.2d 144 (2016).

With this common-law underpinning, "the general rule" is that restrictive covenants "are not favored, and the burden is on [the party] who would enforce such covenants to establish that the activity objected to is within their terms." Scott v. Walker, 274 Va. 209, 212-13, 645 S.E.2d 278 (2007) (citation omitted). Restrictive covenants "are to be construed most strictly against the grantor and persons seeking to enforce them, and substantial doubt or ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the free use of property and against restrictions." Id. at 213, 645 S.E.2d 278 (citation omitted). Virginia courts should "enforce restrictive covenants where the intention of the parties is clear and the restrictions are reasonable" and "if it is apparent from a reading of the whole instrument that the restrictions carry a certain meaning by definite and necessary implication." Shepherd v. Conde, 293 Va. 274, 288, 797 S.E.2d 750 (2017) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Note how you continue to rehash and babble on about your same defective idiotic arguments but don’t address anything I said. Probably bc you can’t.

Those Virginia Supreme Court opinions address everything you said. Are you now calling the VSC idiotic? Insults are the last resort of those who don't have anything intelligent to say. Since you're not getting the point, rehashing is necessary. The legal concepts here are not complex. HOA common area belongs to all members by legal definition and therefore is required to be maintained by all members and no member can be excluded from using it. Restrictive covenants on use of private property are narrowly construed and are for things and activities that have an affect on the community as a whole, such as controlling structural and architectural changes to property (that's what design control means). For example, not having one homeowner build a modern-style facade on his home in a community with colonial-style architecture or building another story on his home that be inconsistent with the row. It's about big things that stand out from the overall look of the community like a sore thumb. It's not about bird feeders and decorations. These arguments have already been decided.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:OMG is it this? https://www.removefrankcapone.org

Ha ha. I found that one too! If that’s at all indicative of what’s going on over there, I wouldn’t buy in that community no matter what.

It's old, almost two years old and Frank was removed from the board. I don't know how the hell he was elected? His problems started in 2014 when I moved in and he was going off on people on Next Door (he was kicked off)

So this has been going on for 9 years???

Him being a terrible neighbor, yes. I think he still lives in the neighborhood. From the video, sounds like he was annoyed with renters parking, ran for HOA president, somehow won, then sued the HOA for the parking spots driving up the legal fees and increasing everyone's fees. Nuts!

He's your typical MAGA ahole who has no understanding of fiscal responsibility.

Wow, this is out of left field. Maybe you're the one whose being the ahole.

[Anonymous]

When is the HOA hosting a block party on Van Valkenburgh lane ? A funeral would be more joyous. Nothing like towing a neighbor for paying and using a common area.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:When is the HOA hosting a block party on Van Valkenburgh lane ? A funeral would be more joyous. Nothing like towing a neighbor for paying and using a common area.

It’s not your parking spot anymore. It’s been given to a unit, which the declaration allows.

[Anonymous]

Oh. So it's not a zoning requirement in the DSUP ? I need a venn diagram to follow all your gobblygook. This provision in the Declaration was written Batt versus. Manchester Oaks. Read the lawsuit and the court rulings.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:Oh. So it's not a zoning requirement in the DSUP ? I need a venn diagram to follow all your gobblygook. This provision in the Declaration was written Batt versus. Manchester Oaks. Read the lawsuit and the court rulings.

Pre Batt versus Manchester Oaks.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote:Oh. So it's not a zoning requirement in the DSUP ? I need a venn diagram to follow all your gobblygook. This provision in the Declaration was written Batt versus. Manchester Oaks. Read the lawsuit and the court rulings.

The city zoning requirement is stupid. If this were true then the HOA would have to annex in more land and not give a common area away.

[Anonymous]

The lawsuit and the association's pleadings regarding the HOA issues in Potomac Yard need to be sent to The Washington Post. Given that Potomac Yard is a large community, these issues impact a significant number of residents, and their perspective could be valuable.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote: The lawsuit and the association's pleadings regarding the HOA issues in Potomac Yard need to be sent to The Washington Post. Given that Potomac Yard is a large community, these issues impact a significant number of residents, and their perspective could be valuable.

You won’t even post them here much less send them to the newspapers. TACO.

[Anonymous]

Anonymous wrote: The lawsuit and the association's pleadings regarding the HOA issues in Potomac Yard need to be sent to The Washington Post. Given that Potomac Yard is a large community, these issues impact a significant number of residents, and their perspective could be valuable.

Sadly, The Post largely ignores local news in Virginia - and has for decades. I agree the questions raised by the litigation would be of broad interest to VA residents.