We don’t even have to suppose! We’ve seen this in its nightmare form. Ferguson, MO, shows us what happens when those who execute the laws take it upon themselves to create their own revenue to fund such enforcement. I’m guessing that all the administrative law dictators in this thread have zero desire to defer to the subject matter experts in the Ferguson, MO police department. |
The agency is still required by law to perform enforcement on fishing quotas to protect the fisheries industry as a whole against depletion from overfishing. First Congress by defunding, and now potentially the Courts, are removing the agency's ability to do the job that they are mandated by statute to do. That seems like a gross judiciary overreach to me, and it goes against the statutes which mandate enforcement. A much better alternative would have been to allow some alternative mechanism for enforcement. Just striking down the ability of agencies to implement the laws that are on the books would be major malfeasance by the courts. There have been cases where states or advocacy groups or others have sued the government to compel it to do the job it's mandated to do. I can see something like that happening. |
The correct fix would be to provide funding to go along with everything that Congress mandates. There are already way too many unfunded mandates in government. |
Yes, created by Republicans, I think written by Scalia, but the current situation is from liberals misusing the deference. Take a look at California's AB5, essentially banning gig workers. Democrats tried to pass it as the PRO Act, and it didn't pass with many Democrats opposed. Now Biden and California's Labor Secretary Su are implementing it as a regulation. |
sure. but congress is also beating the agency up for not doing more enforcement. They are in a no win position. if they did absolutely nothing, they would get sued to do the job they've been mandated to do. There are plenty examples of that. In some ways the agency probably wants SCOTUS to decided against it. It would keep Congress from further politicizing them and making up lies. |
Just have agencies propose regulations to Congress and then they can approve or disapprove. |
Trump should have realized this and had Border Patrol and Customs collect fees for wall funding. |
Guessing you are not a big fan of jury trials. |
Hopefully after this ruling we can move on to doing away with regulation of the stock market, banking, trademark, copyright and patents. |
I predict this will have many unintended side effects. One of them, ironically, may be that the cost of regulation actually increases because of the increased need for attorneys to deal with all the litigation. If regulations are now on shaky legal ground, the obvious course of action for a regulated community is to bog down their regulator with legal action. The regulators will then be required to raise their fees in order to afford more attorneys and legal assistants.
I, for one, am really uneasy with the prospect of things like financial regulations being left to the judiciary. The regulated communities tend to be a lot better funded than their regulators, and there seems to be a lot of opportunity for corruption if this is handed over to elected judges. |
Congress has oversight |
Does this mean Carbon dioxide will stop being a pollutant? |
This may have already been covered, but could someone explain why judicial deference to administrative agencies based on their expertise is appropriate, but it's inappropriate to do so in criminal cases (i.e. prosecutor calling the medical examiner to testify that the cause of death was homicide)?
If the issue is one of routine interpretation, how is that immune from politics, since agencies are part of the Executive Branch and subject to the then-President's policy priorities? It would seem reasonable that everyone has to prove their case. Agencies claiming that they should get deference because they've "always done things this way" isn't much of an excuse. Agencies can certainly explain that a court's departure from their historical interpretation could cause disruption, but doesn't that go to the heart of the case? |
The agency only gets deference in limited circumstances: (1) when Congress has been ambiguous in its drafting of the law text (that is, Congress has not explicitly addressed the issue being argued) and (2) when the agency’s interpretation is “reasonable.” The deference actually acknowledges that we have a dynamic political process and that different Administrations can come to different “reasonable” interpretations of how to faithfully execute a law passed by Congress. It’s also an acknowledgement of the impossibility for Congress to have perfect ex-ante knowledge of how laws will apply to future changes in a marketplace or the expertise to define and calibrate every nuance for a technical issue intended to be covered by a statute. For example, can Congress set the technical parameters of nuclear safety standards in a law? Of course not; as a collective body they do not have the expertise. It is insane for the Supreme Court to mandate that Congress set such standards in a piece of legislation. |
Here’s a twist of irony: will removal of the Chevron deference necessitate a big expansion of government?
If the Judiciary intends to become a policymaking body, they will likely need to build out a deep bench of policy experts that are “loyal” to judges. |