That was their entire AFS portfolio and the loss they took on its sale. The HTM securities couldn't be sold without cratering the bank. |
Not necessarily, but when the Fed first signaled rate hikes they could have done a lot to offset the high-duration HTM portfolio and strengthen their overall position. Like take on some negative duration swaps where they pay fixed and receive floating. But those kinds of trades would reduce earnings and since management’s compensation is based on earnings, they naturally chose not to do that. |
So negligent. There are small agricultural banks that hedge their commodity risks with derivatives, but somehow a $200 billion bank with $115 billion in interest rate risk laden securities could only manage to do $5 billion in gross notional interest rate derivatives. |
I’m not a Trumpian or a supporter of loose regulations, but regulations aren’t meant to create a perfect system where nothing goes wrong. Regulations are burdensome and they require a lot of time and money to fulfill them, and a lot of taxpayer money to hire analysts to review them. There’s nothing inherently wrong with saying, the overall banking industry is positioned well, let’s subject the big banks to these regulations and let the ones who pose less systemic risk not do them if they don’t want to. In this case, a couple of poorly managed banks failed. The FDIC stepped in and did their jobs and the taxpayer will likely not pay a cent. |
I bet it costs a lot less than the various bailouts and corresponding economic losses. |
That's a hugely different type or risk. In this case their risk was people withdrawing large amounts of deposits. The duration risk on their treasuries could only be triggered by a massive immediate historic liquidity event. Something on the scale of tens of billions. The risk part of their portfolio was relatively safe since it was built on doing win-win financial favors for venture capital. They thought they were part of the team. Turns out that they're not. |
I can agree to disagree. They were running huge interest rate risk. And by stuffing most of their securities into HTM, they were running huge liquidity risk because they could not sell even one security without bringing on insolvency . Not managing these kinds of risk risks is what can cause run risk to emerge. |
So then what about Signature? |
Cost to who? This is not costing the taxpayers. It is costing other banks. And if those banks think the costs are too high, they can advocate to increase regulations. Right now they consistently lobby to reduce regulations, but maybe this event will change their calculus. I doubt it though. |
What you wrote makes 0 sense. The bank run was triggered by them having high interest rate risk. Thiel & his coven saw weakness and decided to pounce. |
Pp said the same as you but with more explanation. |
They had a ‘historic liquidity event’ because they had 1) a ridiculous book of assets and 2) ridiculous funding in the form of mondo (uninsured) deposits that could jump ship at any time. Two horrible management decisions that created (short-term) massive profits and big management bonuses. |
Bankers: Deregulate!
Also Bankers: save us, federal government! There are no libertarians in fox holes. |
+1 In the IT world, we have internal "regulations" for a reason. It's burdensome; it's annoying, but it's there for a reason, namely to safeguard the internal infrastructure, financials, and customer information. Similarly, the banking industry absolutely needs regulation for all the same reasons. |