So why should we bail out the rich jerks who threaten the banking system? Screw 'em. Bail out the little guy. Let the wealthy elite hoist themselves on their own petard. |
Exactly. There are a lot of people posting here who know nothing about bank regulation. |
Thiel likely orchestrated this, and the subsequent bailout of the wealthy depositors, so it can be a campaign issue used by the MAGA crowd against Biden. “Biden helped out his wealthy California buddies” — ignoring the reality that many of them are loony libertarians. |
I know that's your party line: Thiel did X. Don't you think if one person can take it down, that's a problem? This in the face of zillions of pages of regulations in place right now. It's not like these aren't already in place. What have all these agencies been doing up until now? They're certainly drawing a pay check. |
Many of the people in banking regulation have a history of failure! Playing the whole high-priest game just makes things worse! |
That you're looking for easy answers and quick excuses. |
Well what is your proposal for how a cree society can stop a private person from causing a bank run by spreading rumors around his wealthy friends? What could be done other than prosecuting him after the fact? Shouldn’t we prosecute this behavior? |
Maybe you ought to look at the CEO who sold millions in SVB stock prior to the fail. |
SVB is not a good poster child for this for this thesis. SVB announced a loss on sales of securities and said they were were going to raise capital to fill it, without having firm commitments in hand for that capital. This causes people to really look at the financials, and they did not tell a good story. This is what set off the rumors. In other words, this was a case where indeed smoke indicated a fire. As a former bank regulator I get why there may have been no really firm regulatory action earlier. People on the ground see red flags for months, raise them several times with management, but management demurs because for whatever reason, they don't want to bother using resources for something they think will work itself out. The people on the ground bow out, satisfied they have done their duty in raising the issues, because they don't want to get a reputation as troublemakers. What I don't get is why all the equity analysts were not all over this bank given its financials. This is perhaps the most mysterious miss. |
This has me rolling my eyes! Forget about ‘equity analysts’ (always a sad profession, recently a dying one!), talk about the failures of government, politicians, the media, the legal profession, academia, civil society, etc in regards not just to banking regulation narrowly (which sucks), but all the related issues around economics and finance that have created these crises and a whole host of other problems. Basically all those worlds play stupid games around denying culpability for their failures, these episodes should lead to lord of questions about all those small worlds. |
Psst…the issue is that no bank should be run with a highly concentrated deposit base. This *used* to be an important part of bank supervision. Deposits, while cheap, can be very fast moving. Thiel might have been the biggest fish, but even without him, the other major depositors and their friends could have done the same thing. It turns out Silicon Valley is much more a tight-knit clique than is commonly discussed. |
I guess I was too subtle in what I said about how management deals with issues. Yes, what I wrote takes place at many levels in many spheres. |
While that is true there's no way a regulation could be written to encompass SVB's particular mix of a concentrated depositor base. For instance while the VCs have some level of control over the behavior of the start ups they fund they don't have legal control. There's also a legal distinction between the various founders' money and their company's money. None of that excuses SVB which should have anticipated the risk but thought they were part of the club. But, try and write a sentence that would define this particular concentration. Best that could be done would be something regarding the amount of accounts and average balance. One of the main problems is that regulations don't ever view the ultra wealthy as potential risks. |
He has precedent. https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/02/hogan-thiel-gawker-trial/554132/ |
Anyone notice that SVB *did* seem to have meaningful credit losses? I’m not sure why, but CRE sounds likely. |