IME, solid finance knowledge (especially risk management) has been increasingly marginalized within a lot of financial institutions. This predates the 2008 collapse, but has actually gained additional traction since then. And Silicon Valley (the place) has been in total denial about zero interest rates role in their putative boom. A local bank getting caught out isn’t all that surprising. |
The VC money tsunami acted like leverage: all decisions were genius in good times…and foolish in bad times. Given their role in being essentially treasury for the VC ecosystem makes me wonder if anyone at the bank understood they had super-easy fee income if they kept assets low-key. |
Tell me the % of the book that was long-dated. Averages can obscure bigly. |
It seems like they were being as conservative as the could, but risk management doesn't pay well and often gets ignored. I'd bet a lot of money that someone high up thought that treasuries = safety and they either ignored opposing views or those views just weren't aired |
Treasuries do equal safety. The mistakes they made were duration and depositer risk. There is nothing they could have done to survive the run once it started. Looking back, it was probably a really bad idea to have 25% of their deposit base under the control of a single well known a-hole. |
Do people have over $250,000 In the bank if they are not buying anything big at any given time? Do they invest and buy bonds at the time? |
Long-maturity assets belong more on insurance company and pension fund balance sheets. The bank should have been buying short t-bills and getting used to less spread. The problem of concentration includes Thiel and friends, but is clearly much larger than them. We clearly didn’t get post-2008 finreg and, gasp, political economy right. |
Large entities need to make payments reliably. Banks perform both the role of facilitating payments AND financing asset purchases. The customers of SVB are almost always moderately large entities that largely just wanted payments processing and cash management. But since the bank holds lots of cash, the bank has to invest it in order to pay interest on deposits AND generate the bank’s income. They just invested the money unwisely, hence their losses. |
It's not clear that even a proactive risk assessment would have caught that long term US bonds would cause the bank to fail. Bonds are very low risk. And at the time they bought them, this would have looked to be among the most conservative options. Im an R and listening to R news and the take is basically "well they were driven by ESG and focused too much on woke stuff." That may well be true, but the investments were in long term US bonds, not used as venture capital. I'm going to need to see a fuller case against these bankers. Some risk is acceptable-- it is part of life. I havent seen any case made yet that their investments were unwise. |
I’m guessing PP wasn’t involved in finance the last time interest rates were rising quickly. This was to be expected and they did manage the cash tsunami poorly. |
They didn’t hedge their 11-figure one-way interest rate risk. That’s their “unwise” investment. |
It’s a finance 101 thing…except ZIRP meant no one remembered it. |
It was only a 5% loss. No bank can survive a bank run like they experienced. |
The bank run was a product of their business model. It’s so, so far from almost any other bank. |
They bought these in 2020 when the market was tanking. Ive never been involved in investment banking, so this may seem like a simple mistake to a pro. But no one is laying out the case that they should have foreseen hyperinflation. There may be a case, but no one is making it. |