There is a lot of space between making development more profitable for developers (if that is indeed what the principals, whoever they are, have said), and either the entire theory of MoCo's housing policy being increasing profits for developers, or building a housing policy around maximizing profit for developers. In any case, here are the basics: People live in housing. Most housing is built by developers. Most developers build housing for profit. There are definitely developer incentives in Montgomery County that I consider bad housing policy, but if the goal is to have more housing, that has to include both developers and profit. |
It doesn't have to include ruining nice SFH neighborhoods miles from public transit though. |
Buses are public transit, and small multi-unit residential buildings do not "ruin" neighborhoods. |
Your opinions are just that, and a whole lot of people think that you are wrong. How many? We won’t know until there is a vote. |
No one said developers shouldn’t make money. Let’s be clear about that so you stop suggesting that they have. Developers should make money unless they’re set up as nonprofits. The critique was of the housing policy’s focus on profits (not production) as the immediate outcome. The principals are the architects and authorizers of the policy. That would be the planning board and the council. The planning chair himself said the focus of the growth and infrastructure policy was making development more profitable. You may disagree with that goal but it’s what he said. I agree there are a lot of bad development incentives in MoCo. The only saving grace is that their ineffectiveness has limited the harm they’ve done to the budget. But planning and the council keep coming up with new ideas for transferring money from other taxpayers to developers in the form of fee reductions and tax abatements, so there’s a risk that it gets worse and they do eventually limit revenue in a way that materially impacts infrastructure and services. |
There is a very real difference between saying that making development more profitable is ONE way to increase housing supply and saying that the "entire theory" of the housing policy is to do that. That is like saying you have a goal to reduce carbon emissions and that being translated as saying your goal is to increase the profitability of renewable energy companies. One is a means to an end, not an end in itself. |
Which chair, what exactly did he say, and when did he say this? Making development more profitable (vs. unprofitable) is a means to an end. I seriously doubt that anybody involved in making housing policy has ever said that it's an end in itself. |
The GIP is not the county's housing policy. So I'm not sure why we are mixing the two. And the stated goal of the GIP is plainly on the website: "The foundation of the Growth and Infrastructure Policy is that Montgomery County must have adequate infrastructure to support growth. This policy is the guide for administering the county’s adequate public facilities (APF) requirements." https://montgomeryplanning.org/planning/countywide/growth-and-infrastructure-policy/ Where did anybody say the goal of that policy is to maximize developer profits? |
The GIP is the county’s growth policy, which is a significant document in the county’s planning cannon, so the comments the planning chair made during its consideration are an important indicator of what the theory of the case is. Casey Anderson said the theory behind the policy was to make development more profitable because “it stands to reason” that higher profits would cause developers to build more housing. The new GIP keeps the underlying rationale, so it’s fair to say the theory of the case hasn’t changed. The immediate outcome of this policy (if it works) is that developers make more money. Anything beyond the immediate outcome is an indirect outcome or more of a hope. Looking at housing production in the county, it’s safe to say it hasn’t worked, even as it has cost taxpayers money. This is just one example. Planning and the council make the same argument every time they put forward a new financial incentive for market rate housing production. It’s in Thrive, and it’s in the Attainable Housing Strategy, among other places. Andrew Friedson has also said he only wants to offer carrots (financial incentives such as tax abatements) and not sticks (whatever he meant by that he never made clear). It’s fair to say that our housing policy for market rate housing has put profitability at its center and that the county hopes that increasing profitability through taxpayer-funded subsidies will result in more production, but it hasn’t so far. All the people hitting back on this characterization seem awfully defensive. Maybe it hits too close to the truth for your comfort. It’s not the only time that politicians have tried to sell subsidies to businesses as helping the middle class, but nearly all the benefits of such policies accrue to businesses and wealthy individuals and very few pass through to the middle class. |
Can you please cite to me where he said that? The policy itself is not designed to maximize profits for developers. Read it. It wants to align with a lot of policy objectives including environmental resilience, safety, good governance, racial equity, housing attainability, etc. Here is one recommendation in the policy: "Recommendation 2.3: Allow funds collected as UPPs to be used for capital projects adding capacity at schools adjacent to the school for which the funds were collected, as outlined in the School Utilization Report." Here is another: "Recommendation 3.2: Require LATR studies for a proposed development project generating 50 or more peak-hour vehicle trips." Another: "Recommendation 3.4: Simplify the Non-Motor Vehicle Adequacy Test. The test will have five components: Pedestrian Level of Comfort (PLOC), illuminance, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliance, bicycle system, and bus transit system. This test will replace the individual pedestrian, bicycle, and bus transit systems tests. I object to your characterization because it simply isn't true. |
The main objective of the GIP was lowering impact fees for certain housing types in certain areas of the county. If you go back and watch the hearings, you’ll hear that ring out very clearly. The other parts of the GIP (which planning wanted to call the “Growth Policy”) are pieces of furniture. It’s interesting that you want to argue about the intent but you don’t deny the outcome. It hasn’t worked. It’s cost us money (except for the lucky few who got subsidies), but it hasn’t resulted in housing. Nor do you deny that the financial incentives proposed in thrive and the the housing strategy work from the same theory: increase profits to increase housing production. You keep posting to pick at nits but we have a policy that isn’t producing more housing. It’s just producing more profit. Maybe you’re happy with that outcome. I think we need more housing. |
I am focused on this issue because I like to try to discuss actual facts and debate about the impact of them. If we can get to some common understanding of the GIP, I am happy to go back to discussing the housing strategy. The bolded is inaccurate. I have read the GIP and watched the hearings. |
Try it another way: if you give a market rate developer a subsidy, what is the first outcome of the subsidy? You’ve given the developer money but haven’t increased costs or demanded anything in return. What is the outcome of that action? |
The outcome of the action you lay out is to increase profits for the developer. But that isn't the point in question. The point in question is whether the "entire theory" or "goal" of the GIP is to maximize profits for developers. It is not. (Note I am speaking about the GIP, not the Attainable Housing strategy) |
What do you think they’re trying to do when they take actions that increase the profits of developers? |