Trump's Objectives for the War

Yesterday, as I wrote in my blog post, cult leader, convicted felon, and failed President Donald Trump "truthed" that the United States has been engaged in "productive" conversations with Iran regarding "a complete and total resolution of our hostilities in the Middle East". I suggested in that post that Trump was likely either outright lying about or greatly exaggerating any discussions with Iran in order to steady the oil and stock markets. If so, Trump was successful because oil prices dropped and the stock market rose. However, much as I suspected, as the day went on, the more it appeared that Trump was not being forthright. Today, oil is again up, and the stock market opened down. In various media appearances throughout the day, Trump detailed what the imaginary discussions had allegedly entailed. He claimed that the U.S. and Iran had already agreed on 15 points. He also went on to suggest that he was planning to negotiate additional Iranian concessions. It is likely that Trump's assertions were nothing more than the result of his cognitive impairment and have nothing to do with reality. On the other hand, the items that Trump listed might be an indication of how he is hoping to resolve the war. If so, Trump's goals range from the overly optimistic to the outright delusional.

First, as with almost anything having to do with Trump, I probably need to start with a caveat. As I mentioned in yesterday's post, Trump has twice engaged in negotiations with Iran, claimed that there had been progress, and then attacked the country. Therefore, even if discussions with Iran were now taking place — and to be clear, there is no evidence that they are — it would not necessarily signal that Trump is planning a negotiated end to the war. In fact, it is probably a safe bet to assume that Trump was primarily aiming to calm the oil and stock markets, and there is nothing further to be gained from analyzing his remarks. Supporting this argument is that a Marine Expedition Unit is still sailing towards Iran, and thousands of other troops have apparently been ordered to the region. Yesterday on Bluesky, Wesley Morgan posted flight-tracking data showing flights leaving from airports frequently used by U.S. special operations forces and heading towards Israel and Jordan. It is entirely possible that Trump's goal is to salvage the markets until a ground attack can be launched. If so, it is entirely possible that this post will be overtaken by events.

It is also important to keep in mind that, cognitively, Trump is simply not up to the job. I have written several times about reports that Trump did not expect Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz, even though just about anyone who had spent 10 minutes studying the issue would have expected that. Yesterday, Trump said that he was surprised that Iran attacked the neighboring Gulf countries. "That was not supposed to — nobody was even thinking about it," Trump said. Again, the retaliatory attacks should have been expected, and probably were by just about everyone other than Trump. There are real questions about whether anything Trump has to say can be believed.

Speaking to reporters yesterday, Trump claimed that the U.S. would be holding discussions with the Iranians "by probably phone" but that "we'll at some point very soon meet." On X, Iranian journalist Abas Aslani wrote that the U.S. had proposed talks with the Speaker of Iran's Majles (Parliament) Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. However, apparently Ghalibaf has not responded. For his part, Ghalibaf denied that negotiations have taken place and accused Trump of attempting to manipulate the financial and oil markets. The Times reported that Trump's Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, is due to travel to Pakistan to hold in-person talks. The newspaper further reported that "so far no sign of any meaningful Iranian figure joining him there." Aslani also wrote that the U.S., via intermediaries, proposed that Vice President and reply guy JD Vance lead the negotiations due to Iranian distrust of Witkoff.

My own speculation is that Witkoff has, through intermediaries, suggested to someone in Iran that they meet for talks in Pakistan. Such a meeting may or may not take place. The key thing to watch is whether Vance heads to Pakistan.

The next question is the agenda of such a meeting. Talking to reporters yesterday about U.S. objectives, Trump said "low key on the missiles, we want to see peace in the Middle East. We want the nuclear dust, we're gonna want that and I think we're are going to get it. We've agreed to that." It's anybody's guess what Trump meant by "nuclear dust," but reporters seemed to interpret it as "enriched uranium." When he was asked specifically about enriched uranium, Trump said, "we also want the enriched uranium." Trump further specified that "We want no enrichment." In the same conversation, Trump said that the U.S. and Iran have agreed to "Like 15 points." He began outlining them as Iran not having a nuclear weapon and "That's number 1, 2, and 3. They will never have a nuclear weapon." He further said that Iran had agreed to that. Trump is almost certainly lying about this, though the late Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, who was killed on the opening day of the war, had issued a fatwa forbidding nuclear weapons. So, to that extent, Iran had previously implicitly agreed to not having nuclear weapons. Because Mojtaba Khamenei's position regarding nuclear weapons is not clear, the war may have actually undermined the earlier position.

Trump was asked "Has Iran agreed to no enrichment whatsoever, even for civilian purposes?" He replied, "They have." Again, this is almost certainly a lie. The Iranians have long insisted on the right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes. Though a temporary halt might be possible because the Iranian enrichment facilities are out of commission now anyway.

I have a theory about what Trump was saying. My guess is that Trump is assuming that Iranian concessions made during negotiations before the war are still valid. Before Trump launched the war, Witkoff and Jared Kushner held multiple rounds of negotiations with an Iranian delegation led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. According to a very detailed account of the talks published by Amwaj Media, the U.S. and Iranian delegations agreed to six "guiding principles" for a deal. These were: "fuel production, non-accumulation of enriched uranium, full verification, sanctions relief, economic cooperation, and peaceful coexistence." Moreover, the two sides apparently agreed on many specific points of an agreement.

One thing that seemed to have hampered early rounds of the negotiations was that neither Kushner nor Witkoff had the technical expertise to understand what the Iranians were offering in terms of concessions. For instance, according to the Amwaj Media account, Witkoff did not know the difference between an enrichment facility and a reactor. This shortcoming was somewhat addressed by the inclusion of Britain's national security advisor, Jonathan Powell, in the final talks. According to Powell, "Iran agreed to a three- to-five-year pause on domestic enrichment." This might be where Trump got the idea that Iran is now agreeing to "no enrichment whatsoever".

I am far from an expert on nuclear agreements, but from my layperson's reading of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the deal that former President Barack Obama made with Iran and from which Trump withdrew, and the terms that Witkoff and Kushner negotiated, they sound very similar. There are a couple of important differences. The JCPOA allowed some domestic enrichment. However, the Iranian concession of 3-5 years of no enrichment could be explained due to the fact that their enrichment facilities were put out of commission by Trump's bombing last year. Essentially, the Iranians were offering to halt enrichment until they were technically able to undertake enrichment again. Also, the JCPOA sunset after 15 years. The new agreement would have been permanent. This would have been a good deal, and Trump should have taken it then. Now, it sounds like he does want the deal. The question is whether the Iranians still want it. The Amwaj Media article quotes Araghchi as saying:

You may launch an attack, and we will exercise our legitimate right of defense. No one will win in that situation, and afterward you will have to return to this very negotiating table—and it is not even certain that anyone will still want to negotiate with you.

The bottom line is that when Trump referred to a list of 15 things to which the U.S. and Iranians agreed, he may have been talking about the points of agreement between Araghchi and Witkoff/Kushner. It's not clear that offer still stands, but it is at least in the realm of possibility.

On the more delusional end of things, Trump's initial hope when launching the war was that he could repeat the "Venezuela model" in Iran, and he apparently still has not dropped that aspiration. Yesterday, Trump was asked by CNN's Kaitlan Collins who would be controlling the Strait of Hormuz if the negotiations were successful. Trump's response was that it would be "jointly controlled." When asked by whom, Trump said, "Maybe me. Maybe me. Me and the ayatollah whoever the ayatollah is, whoever the next ayatollah is." Trump went on to say that there would be "a very serious form of regime change," but then argued that regime change had already taken place. Trump continued, suggesting that "maybe we would find somebody like" Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, who took over in place of Nicolás Maduro.

It is not that what Trump is suggesting would be impossible, but that it would be impossible through negotiations at this time. What Trump is proposing might be the outcome of a totally defeated Iran. But Iran is not defeated. Not by a long shot. While the number of missiles and drones launched by Iran is down, the hit rate is up. Data shows that in the initial salvos, Iran's "hit rate" was below 5%. Now it is approximately 25%. As Iran has degraded its opponents' defenses, it is getting more bang for its buck, not to put it in too stark of terms.

Moreover, the regime is still functioning. The "next ayatollah," Mojtaba Khamenei, has already been chosen as Supreme Leader. Yesterday it was announced that Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, a hawkish Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps general, would be the new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, replacing late Ali Larijani. The regime is replacing its own leaders, not waiting on Trump to choose them. The idea that Khamenei and Zolghadr would agree to give Trump joint control of the Strait of Hormuz is completely insane.

For their part, the Iranians issued a new set of conditions. These were:

1. guarantee of the non-repetition of war
2. closure of US military bases in the region
3. repelling aggression and payment of compensation to Iran
4. ending the war on all regional fronts
5. implementation of a new legal regime for the Strait of Hormuz
6. prosecution and extradition of anti-Iranian media operatives.

This list is just as delusional as Trump's more fanciful ideas. However, it shows just how far apart the two sides are at the moment and just how unrealistic Trump is in suggesting that there will be an agreement in five days.

I remain convinced, as apparently is the Iranian Speaker of the Majles, that Trump's comments yesterday were primarily aimed at calming the financial markets and not based in reality. With U.S. troops still moving into the region, it is highly likely that there will soon be ground action. If, however, Trump decides that the economic and political costs are too high and he prefers to TACO, he will likely find that the Witkoff/Kushner agreement is no longer on the table. By all appearances, Trump would simply like to get back to the pre-war status quo. The end result, however, is that the war may end with Iran in a stronger position than it was before the fighting. It is for exactly that reason that Trump may prefer boots on the ground.