Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:OP, I agree and suspect strongly that YY will join the common lottery for these reasons. Too much risk of server crash, brawls among people camping on the sidewalk outside YY etc.

Think they considered this year but they didn't know if they would have Pk3 until too late in the process. And they also wanted to see how it went.

This. I'm a Yu Ying parent and when I asked the admin about the common lottery last year they did say they were actively considering it but needed to figure out if they were doing a PS3 class first which wasn't confirmed until after the common lottery happened. They also wanted to make sure the lottery went well- meaning no major glitches or snafus- but it was primarily about juggling the PS3 decision. I suspect they will join this year and the decision not to so far is hardly nefarious.

As far as improving your chances, if you are willing to stand in line you probably have a better shot with Yu Ying's time stamped wait list than with the common lottery, though I agree both approaches help address the concern of having truly committed families attend.

What do mean by truly committed? Parents willing to speak Chinese at home if they can? Willing and able to host Chinese au pairs through the J-1 visa program? Take regular family trips to Chinese-speaking swathes of the earth, and send kids to immerson summer camps? Invest in instructional software and DVD collections? Hire tutors and schlep kids to heritage schools in the burbs on weekends for extra instruction? These enrichment options are expensive and DC Charter mainly wants kids whose parents can't begin to afford them. You guys are losing the forest for the trees on what makes language immersion work into the teen years. A well-designed lottery process is the tip of the iceberg.

Yes you quoted me and I should have mentioned I am a YY parent.

OP just email the school. Likely they can tell you their plans though top priority is construction and getting ready for school year.

Anonymous wrote:OP, I agree and suspect strongly that YY will join the common lottery for these reasons. Too much risk of server crash, brawls among people camping on the sidewalk outside YY etc.

Think they considered this year but they didn't know if they would have Pk3 until too late in the process. And they also wanted to see how it went.

This. I'm a Yu Ying parent and when I asked the admin about the common lottery last year they did say they were actively considering it but needed to figure out if they were doing a PS3 class first which wasn't confirmed until after the common lottery happened. They also wanted to make sure the lottery went well- meaning no major glitches or snafus- but it was primarily about juggling the PS3 decision. I suspect they will join this year and the decision not to so far is hardly nefarious.

As far as improving your chances, if you are willing to stand in line you probably have a better shot with Yu Ying's time stamped wait list than with the common lottery, though I agree both approaches help address the concern of having truly committed families attend.

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:OP, sorry that that these wankers have mangled your innocuous thread.

PS. Hope you've learned to avoid advocating a thing where YY is concerned.

Meh, OPs original assumption that the common lottery ranking takes care of YY's concern about getting parents serious about Chinese isn't really true. Common lottery computer only looks at your random assigned lottery number for the most part, not how you ranked the school until it gets to you. Parents who would rank YY #1 but got a random lottery number of 480 would NOT get in ahead of someone who ranked YY #7 but had a 200 random number, unless 200 got to one of their higher ranked choices, which might or might not happen.

We plan to apply next year and we hope they keep a separate lottery.

OP here,
Yes this thread was completely derailed by crazy and became very "Yellow River Elegy" for a while there (look it up). To the poster I quoted above, I think my point still stands but only under the assumption that YY is a top choice school. Someone with a good lottery number would get their top choice, not their 7th choice, and under my assumption, YY is so attractive that the few seats it offers go to people with very good lottery numbers. I am assuming that YY is as competitive as other top schools and so no one will get in who ranked it #7th. Example: I live in bounds for Brent and need a PK 3 spot. I get a highly competitive lottery number. If I prioritize Brent I get one of the 20 or 30 spots at Brent. If I prioritize YY I get one of the 10 spots at YY. YY ends up only with families who prioritized it, and no families who applied as a free lottery ticket, got in by chance and are trying it out because they didn't get in anywhere else.

I am advocating this out of self interest. My husband waited outside in the cold for 8+ hours last fall and it looks like we won't be getting in. I don't expect he will be interested in doing that again.

I also think YY staff cannot effectively administer something that has become this high stakes. They are comparing tenths of a second between in person and online applications among parents for whom this means saving hundreds of thousands of dollars in private school tuition. It is a lawsuit waiting to happen.

If I were their Admins, I wouldn't be worried one single bit about lawsuits re: the waitlist from people currently paying "hundreds of thousands of dollars in private school tuition". YY is for everyone that can get in, but charters were hardly set up to cater to the needs of those who can afford those prices for private. Any court that understands charter laws would laugh that suit right out the door.

OP, I agree and suspect strongly that YY will join the common lottery for these reasons. Too much risk of server crash, brawls among people camping on the sidewalk outside YY etc.

Think they considered this year but they didn't know if they would have Pk3 until too late in the process. And they also wanted to see how it went.

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:OP, sorry that that these wankers have mangled your innocuous thread.

PS. Hope you've learned to avoid advocating a thing where YY is concerned.

Meh, OPs original assumption that the common lottery ranking takes care of YY's concern about getting parents serious about Chinese isn't really true. Common lottery computer only looks at your random assigned lottery number for the most part, not how you ranked the school until it gets to you. Parents who would rank YY #1 but got a random lottery number of 480 would NOT get in ahead of someone who ranked YY #7 but had a 200 random number, unless 200 got to one of their higher ranked choices, which might or might not happen.

We plan to apply next year and we hope they keep a separate lottery.

OP here,
Yes this thread was completely derailed by crazy and became very "Yellow River Elegy" for a while there (look it up). To the poster I quoted above, I think my point still stands but only under the assumption that YY is a top choice school. Someone with a good lottery number would get their top choice, not their 7th choice, and under my assumption, YY is so attractive that the few seats it offers go to people with very good lottery numbers. I am assuming that YY is as competitive as other top schools and so no one will get in who ranked it #7th. Example: I live in bounds for Brent and need a PK 3 spot. I get a highly competitive lottery number. If I prioritize Brent I get one of the 20 or 30 spots at Brent. If I prioritize YY I get one of the 10 spots at YY. YY ends up only with families who prioritized it, and no families who applied as a free lottery ticket, got in by chance and are trying it out because they didn't get in anywhere else.

I am advocating this out of self interest. My husband waited outside in the cold for 8+ hours last fall and it looks like we won't be getting in. I don't expect he will be interested in doing that again.

I also think YY staff cannot effectively administer something that has become this high stakes. They are comparing tenths of a second between in person and online applications among parents for whom this means saving hundreds of thousands of dollars in private school tuition. It is a lawsuit waiting to happen.

dcmom wrote:

Anonymous wrote:There is simply no such thing as "stragegy-proofing" the lottery. Whether it goes the way it did this year, or there are lotteries for each school within the common lottery, or all #1 rankings for one school are considered first... whatever the rules are, parents will do exactly what they feel they need to: apply in the way they think will give them the best shot at the best school for their child.

At the end of the day, there are finite spots at finite schools. I don't understand how you can say that it's better to have people who ranked a school #7 have a chance to get in over all the people who ranked it #1, but that's what you're saying by saying you prefer the current system. Doing the algorithm in a way where only people who ranked a popular school #1 have a chance basically makes people really think about what school they most want, but it doesn't somehow decrease the number of slots at a school or increase the number of people who get in. Your odds of getting in at any school (including the less popular safety schools) do not change, but the matching of parents to schools they want the most actually increases. Why is it a bad idea to have only people who get into the most popular schools be the people who wanted it badly enough to rank it #1? I don't understand your point.

If the common lottery were run the way you suggest, I would not place my #1 school there and would move it elsewhere. If out in a school where I had a decent shot at getting in there. Otherwise I would probably get shut out of my decent shot school too and not get into my top choices. In other words, I would rerank and my #1 school would not really be the #1 school among my 12 choices. That is what the DME wants to avoid. Otherwise, people's #1 choices aren't actually their top choices. It messed with the whole point of the system.

I agree with you entirely that there are limited spots at schools--that's why a lottery is needed. The common lottery gets people to put their choices down in the order that they actually prefer them and them puts them into the highest-ranked choice with space, after preferences are taken into account. It sucks if, like me, you get a late lottery draw, but it is fair and does put people where they want to be based on what is available when their lottery number comes up.

I hear what you're saying, I really do. Here's what I'm saying (and the numbers are made up, just used as examples): If for this last lottery there were 4,000 spots total available in the lottery, then by the start of school some 3,700 will be taken (and the remaining 300 will be at schools that are under-enrolled). So 3,700 parents had kids that were matched in slots in the common lottery. In a lot of cases (no data on exactly how many but it's a given that this happened frequently because of the design of the system) there were people with excellent lottery numbers that got into their 1st or 2nd choices. Then there were even more examples of people with very good numbers who got into their 3rd or 4th choices. Then those with good numbers who got into 5th and 6th choices. And on and on to those with bad numbers who were waitlisted everywhere and too far down to likely get in anywhere with a waitlist.

So if my rankings looked like this: #1 Mann OOB (because that's where I really really wanted to go); #2 LAMB (because if I can't go to Mann I really want Spanish, Montessori and DCI); #3 Lee Montessori; #4 Inspired Teaching; #5 Eaton, and then 7 more choices, and my number was good enough that I got into Eaton and waitlisted at Mann, Lamb, Lee and IT, I would be going to Eaton (let's assume the waitlist at my other 1-4 don't move enough for me to get in.)

Meanwhile, someone with a pretty bad number wanted to go to Eaton more than anything, ranked it #1, and got waitlisted everywhere except their #11 school.

In my scenario where each pull starts with all those (within preference groups) who ranked the school #1, the exact same number of parents (3,700) still get their kid a slot, but the % of those in the more popular schools who get their first choice is higher because the waitlist is based on getting everyone who ranked it #1 on that school's waitlist first, and then everyone else (in order of preference and ranking). There are issues with how sibs and IB preference (where applicable) comes in, i.e. if you're applying for PS3 to your IB school but rank it #4, should someone with no preference who ranks it #1 get in before you? Probably not gonna happen, but at least only those with IB status who ranked it #1 will be considered first, and then IB ranking it #2, etc., which is still an improvement to everyone with IB status getting shot first regardless of how they ranked the school.

So under the past year's model there is more randomness and possibility of people with good lottery numbers getting their 5th or 6th or 8th (depending on which schools they chose) choice, while someone who ranks the same school #1 has no shot because their lottery number is so bad. The exact same number of kids get slots under either model, but the one I'm advocating has a much higher % of kids matched in schools they ranked #1. If I'm OOB for Eaton but work nearby and love the school and rank it #1, I should have a better shot than the OOB family who ranks it #8 but has a much better random lottery number than me but doesn't get off the waitlist at any higher schools.

That is all I'm saying. I think we understand each other and it's fine if we agree to disagree.

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:But that is the whole point! There is no more incentive to rank your first choice #1 than for it to increase your chances of getting in if you rank it #1! The ideal matching system matches not just what the school is looking for (families with preference first, than no preference) but also what families are looking for (I wanted School A most, so ranked it #1, so I should get a better shot than the next person who ranked School A #2).

There is no additional incentive to do anything differently if the parent's ranking counts, it just makes it count more. But you were always a fool to not arrange your choices in the order you most wanted them, because to order them differently means risking getting into your #4 school and being dropped from #s 5-12. If you liked #5 better than #4, you should have switched their rankings.

Sure there is. I ranked MV #1 this year even though they only had 8 non sib spots. If only the people who had ranked it #1 had a chance, then I would have had an only slightly higher odds of getting in (since there are only 8 seats) but I would have had no chance at my #2 choice (two rivers), because only those ranking it #1 would have had any chance of getting in. The best strategy for me would have been to apply to one of my late choices who would not have had many people ranking it #1 but would have been a lot less desirable for me.

One of the goals of the DME's office when I spoke with them was to ensure that the lottery didn't have people making strategic ranking choices once they chose the schools to apply to ("strategy proof"). Of course, there is strategy in choosing where to apply since you aren't guaranteed anywhere for PK3 and PK4, which is why I applied (and am sending my child to) my unpopular IB school.

I didn't do well with the lottery, but it was still the best algorithm.

There is simply no such thing as "stragegy-proofing" the lottery. Whether it goes the way it did this year, or there are lotteries for each school within the common lottery, or all #1 rankings for one school are considered first... whatever the rules are, parents will do exactly what they feel they need to: apply in the way they think will give them the best shot at the best school for their child.

At the end of the day, there are finite spots at finite schools. I don't understand how you can say that it's better to have people who ranked a school #7 have a chance to get in over all the people who ranked it #1, but that's what you're saying by saying you prefer the current system. Doing the algorithm in a way where only people who ranked a popular school #1 have a chance basically makes people really think about what school they most want, but it doesn't somehow decrease the number of slots at a school or increase the number of people who get in. Your odds of getting in at any school (including the less popular safety schools) do not change, but the matching of parents to schools they want the most actually increases. Why is it a bad idea to have only people who get into the most popular schools be the people who wanted it badly enough to rank it #1? I don't understand your point.

If the common lottery were run the way you suggest, I would not place my #1 school there and would move it elsewhere. If out in a school where I had a decent shot at getting in there. Otherwise I would probably get shut out of my decent shot school too and not get into my top choices. In other words, I would rerank and my #1 school would not really be the #1 school among my 12 choices. That is what the DME wants to avoid. Otherwise, people's #1 choices aren't actually their top choices. It messed with the whole point of the system.

I agree with you entirely that there are limited spots at schools--that's why a lottery is needed. The common lottery gets people to put their choices down in the order that they actually prefer them and them puts them into the highest-ranked choice with space, after preferences are taken into account. It sucks if, like me, you get a late lottery draw, but it is fair and does put people where they want to be based on what is available when their lottery number comes up.

Anonymous wrote:That's one of the inherent problems with the system - people who aren't even interested in the mission and objectives of charters are signing up - for example people who sign up at Yu Ying but aren't actually interested in learning Mandarin.

Maybe part of the centralized lottery process should be that before you can click the button to select a charter, you have to first read through a description of their mission, culture and objectives.

Actually this was in place for MV for the MySchoolDC lottery this year. When you selected it you had to click and "I've read this" or "I understand" after a sentence of two indicated it was a language/cultural immersion program.

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:Yu Ying had 5 spaces for Prek3 and 9 spaces for PreK4 this year for the lottery.

They had no spaces in grades K, 1st, and 2nd so it was only the waitlist for people who applied to these grades.

Not sure if being in the common lottery will make any difference for future yrs other than getting rid of the waitlist by timestamp which will become completely random like other HRCS.

Wow, last year there were 35 spaces that went to lottery for PreK4. 35 to 9 is a big change, and I guess it's been going in that direction every year (wasn't it only SY11-12 when they still went through their whole waitlist?).

Yeah, it isn't what it use to be. My DC is in the huge jumbo class, rising 2nd, and we applied in the afternoon on the day the lottery opened (b/c I forgot) and got a wl number in the 20ties and got in by May.

YY was the only public school we applied to and we chose it over private school for the Mandarin.

I feel very bad for families that really want Mandarin immersion for their kids and can't get in.

All the people complaining about YY should start another Mandarin immersion school.

Anonymous wrote:

Anonymous wrote:But that is the whole point! There is no more incentive to rank your first choice #1 than for it to increase your chances of getting in if you rank it #1! The ideal matching system matches not just what the school is looking for (families with preference first, than no preference) but also what families are looking for (I wanted School A most, so ranked it #1, so I should get a better shot than the next person who ranked School A #2).

There is no additional incentive to do anything differently if the parent's ranking counts, it just makes it count more. But you were always a fool to not arrange your choices in the order you most wanted them, because to order them differently means risking getting into your #4 school and being dropped from #s 5-12. If you liked #5 better than #4, you should have switched their rankings.

Sure there is. I ranked MV #1 this year even though they only had 8 non sib spots. If only the people who had ranked it #1 had a chance, then I would have had an only slightly higher odds of getting in (since there are only 8 seats) but I would have had no chance at my #2 choice (two rivers), because only those ranking it #1 would have had any chance of getting in. The best strategy for me would have been to apply to one of my late choices who would not have had many people ranking it #1 but would have been a lot less desirable for me.

One of the goals of the DME's office when I spoke with them was to ensure that the lottery didn't have people making strategic ranking choices once they chose the schools to apply to ("strategy proof"). Of course, there is strategy in choosing where to apply since you aren't guaranteed anywhere for PK3 and PK4, which is why I applied (and am sending my child to) my unpopular IB school.

I didn't do well with the lottery, but it was still the best algorithm.

There is simply no such thing as "stragegy-proofing" the lottery. Whether it goes the way it did this year, or there are lotteries for each school within the common lottery, or all #1 rankings for one school are considered first... whatever the rules are, parents will do exactly what they feel they need to: apply in the way they think will give them the best shot at the best school for their child.

At the end of the day, there are finite spots at finite schools. I don't understand how you can say that it's better to have people who ranked a school #7 have a chance to get in over all the people who ranked it #1, but that's what you're saying by saying you prefer the current system. Doing the algorithm in a way where only people who ranked a popular school #1 have a chance basically makes people really think about what school they most want, but it doesn't somehow decrease the number of slots at a school or increase the number of people who get in. Your odds of getting in at any school (including the less popular safety schools) do not change, but the matching of parents to schools they want the most actually increases. Why is it a bad idea to have only people who get into the most popular schools be the people who wanted it badly enough to rank it #1? I don't understand your point.

That's one of the inherent problems with the system - people who aren't even interested in the mission and objectives of charters are signing up - for example people who sign up at Yu Ying but aren't actually interested in learning Mandarin.

Maybe part of the centralized lottery process should be that before you can click the button to select a charter, you have to first read through a description of their mission, culture and objectives.

Anonymous wrote:But that is the whole point! There is no more incentive to rank your first choice #1 than for it to increase your chances of getting in if you rank it #1! The ideal matching system matches not just what the school is looking for (families with preference first, than no preference) but also what families are looking for (I wanted School A most, so ranked it #1, so I should get a better shot than the next person who ranked School A #2).

There is no additional incentive to do anything differently if the parent's ranking counts, it just makes it count more. But you were always a fool to not arrange your choices in the order you most wanted them, because to order them differently means risking getting into your #4 school and being dropped from #s 5-12. If you liked #5 better than #4, you should have switched their rankings.

Sure there is. I ranked MV #1 this year even though they only had 8 non sib spots. If only the people who had ranked it #1 had a chance, then I would have had an only slightly higher odds of getting in (since there are only 8 seats) but I would have had no chance at my #2 choice (two rivers), because only those ranking it #1 would have had any chance of getting in. The best strategy for me would have been to apply to one of my late choices who would not have had many people ranking it #1 but would have been a lot less desirable for me.

One of the goals of the DME's office when I spoke with them was to ensure that the lottery didn't have people making strategic ranking choices once they chose the schools to apply to ("strategy proof"). Of course, there is strategy in choosing where to apply since you aren't guaranteed anywhere for PK3 and PK4, which is why I applied (and am sending my child to) my unpopular IB school.

I didn't do well with the lottery, but it was still the best algorithm.

But that is the whole point! There is no more incentive to rank your first choice #1 than for it to increase your chances of getting in if you rank it #1! The ideal matching system matches not just what the school is looking for (families with preference first, than no preference) but also what families are looking for (I wanted School A most, so ranked it #1, so I should get a better shot than the next person who ranked School A #2).

There is no additional incentive to do anything differently if the parent's ranking counts, it just makes it count more. But you were always a fool to not arrange your choices in the order you most wanted them, because to order them differently means risking getting into your #4 school and being dropped from #s 5-12. If you liked #5 better than #4, you should have switched their rankings.

Anonymous wrote:Different poster, but PP your understanding of the common lottery is wrong. It would be so much better if it worked through #1 picks first; but it doesn't. It takes the person with random lottery #0001 or however many there were, and taking preference groups into consideration (siblings and IB where applicable) it works through all of that #0001 person's list to match them, and then moves onto #0002. Person #9999 pretty much has zero chance in Hades getting matched anywhere on their list of 12 unless they apply to a school that never has a waiting list. If it went through #1 rankings first, that would be much fairer, but person #0050 who ranks Yu Ying 11th has a better chance of getting in than person #0600 who ranks Yu Ying #1.

If they figure out how to have the algorithm consider the parent's ranking of schools as well as random lottery number and preference, that would be a great improvement.

Agree with your understanding of how the lottery works, but disagree that having it randomly choose among people who ranked a school #1 is a better outcome. That would give people an incentive to strategically rank schools.