Anonymous wrote:Anonymous wrote:At restaurants, we should seat people in order of who is most hungry.
Conversely, when you show up at a particular restaurant, would you be ok being offered a table at a restaurant on the other side of town instead? Or else being turned away and being told you can try again next year?
Anonymous wrote:Anonymous wrote:Many people who rank a less popular school #1 would not match there if they draw a poor common lotto # because those who draw a better number, but don't have it ranked #1 would be waitlisted (or get-in) before them.
This is what happens now. We drew a crap number this year. Someone else who drew a better number got matched with our #1 choice, even though they ranked it #10. So we're not going to a school we really want and neither are they.
I'm with you, OP! After all the sibling, in-boundary, etc preferences, the WL would be ranked by preference. So everyone who ranked it #1 would get in or get on the WL in the order of their lottery number, then once you're through the #1s, all the #2s rank in order of their lottery number, then #3s, etc. Makes sense to me. Not sure how this would result in more gaming the system than we currently have -- if people are already lotterying for schools where they have a <5% chance of getting in, you're "wasting" that spot on your list just as much as you would under this system.
Anonymous wrote:At restaurants, we should seat people in order of who is most hungry.
Anonymous wrote:Many people who rank a less popular school #1 would not match there if they draw a poor common lotto # because those who draw a better number, but don't have it ranked #1 would be waitlisted (or get-in) before them.
Anonymous wrote:Anonymous wrote:Anonymous wrote:Anonymous wrote:Anonymous wrote:OP = not a Nobel prize winner
Oh, come on. She was just brainstorming an idea.
An idea that shows zero understanding of how the lottery works. Okay.
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Well, now she's clarified that she only wants two choices, number 1 and your IB school, so she's proposing an entirely different lottery altogether, where you just throw your name in for a single school.
Anonymous wrote:Anonymous wrote:Anonymous wrote:Anonymous wrote:Anonymous wrote:OP = not a Nobel prize winner
Oh, come on. She was just brainstorming an idea.
An idea that shows zero understanding of how the lottery works. Okay.
![]()
Well, now she's clarified that she only wants two choices, number 1 and your IB school, so she's proposing an entirely different lottery altogether, where you just throw your name in for a single school.
Anonymous wrote:An idea: For future years, update the common lottery algorithm to add a new "preference" for the school you ranked #1. Just like a sibling or in-bound preference, you would get a preference at the school you ranked #1 over all other applicants who did not rank that school #1. This preference would come after all other preferences (so, you'd be after sibling, in-bound preferences, but before people who do not have any preference).
This helps more students get into the school they ranked #1. It's fair because everybody can only put one single school in their #1 spot, so everybody gets to pick that one school they want this extra preference at. If you don't get an initial match at your #1 school, you would still have a better wait list number at your #1 school than those who did not rank that school #1.
Some strategy involved. If you put a school with a long wait list #1 (YY, MV, CMI, etc.), you are taking a bigger risk because while you have an improved chance to get into that school, you may end up "wasting" your #1 preference if you don't get in. But, put a school with an average size wait list that likely would have fewer people giving it their #1 preference (maybe Haynes, Lee, etc.), then you are much more likely to get in.
I think adding this new preference would really help balance out some of the lotto luck that comes from having a common lottery where you get one and only one lotto #. While it's adds one more wrinkle of complexity to school choice, its still simple enough that everybody can understand it, and shouldn't be too much difficulty to implement mathematically because the algorithm already is capable of handling preferences.
Anonymous wrote:How about preference points to people shut out or matched with low choices for the next year? Of course I suggest this as DC's number has been in the bottom 25% the last 3 yearsbut seriously, it might cut down on the constant switching and trading up and keep consistency from year to year in many schools.
Anonymous wrote:Anonymous wrote:Anonymous wrote:Anonymous wrote:OP = not a Nobel prize winner
Oh, come on. She was just brainstorming an idea.
An idea that shows zero understanding of how the lottery works. Okay.
![]()
Anonymous wrote:Anonymous wrote:Anonymous wrote:OP = not a Nobel prize winner
Oh, come on. She was just brainstorming an idea.
An idea that shows zero understanding of how the lottery works. Okay.