Anonymous wrote:
Anonymous wrote:
Cite your arguments. Saying it's a very winnable lawsuit without any appeal to legal precedent or even legalistic arguments contributes little to the discussion. Saying it so matter-of-factly when you have limited legal background is yet worse.
In 1970, Deal was redistricted to include Mann and Hearst, and the redistricting was challenged in court. Judge Skelley Wright ordered the redistricting reversed, and writing that:
any action by the Board itself which further imperils the integrated status of one of the few remaining District schools where real integration is possible ... must be treated by this court as a violation of its 1967 decree.
(see
http://www.leagle.com/decision/19701040320FSupp720_1890)
The "1967 decree" was the ruling in Hobson vs. Hansen, which abolished tracking and any other school organizational schemes which were discriminatory in effect.
This ruling has governed DCPS ever since, that no redistricting can reduce the diversity of an integrated school. Note that intent is not a consideration, just the outcome.
Thank you.
Several notes, bearing in mind that I am not a lawyer (so dismiss at will). (I have studied many Supreme Court cases for economics research projects, so I'm at least familiar with legal argumentation.)
"The facts as seen by the court are that the school board is under an injunction against racial or social discrimination, and that it has violated this injunction by knowingly taking a pupil placement action which permits white children to escape an increasingly black school." The legal case cited is about removing students from a relatively integrated school for the express purpose of escaping integration. That would not be the intent, outcome, or process here.
Importantly, the case pertains to the move from an undercrowded school to an overcrowded school. That cannot be emphasized enough when judging the applicability of this ruling to the present process. Those defendants [Hearst and Mann seeking to move from Gordon MS to Deal MS] admitted that the move exacerbated the crowding problem and reflected a deviation from boundary criteria. (They say it's only a small deviation.) These facts/admissions limit the scope of the ruling.
The legal opinion reaffirms neighborhood boundary policy in several places (though admittedly lukewarm). For example,
"Although the court in its 1967 decree did not ban the neighborhood school policy, it did hold improper the use of this policy as an excuse for discrimination in pupil assignment." Elsewhere too.
The judge reached her verdict by concluding
"ostensible reasons for [School Board Administrator] modification of the proposed cluster plan as being mere rationalizations of segregatory intent."
There seems to be some overreach here:
"While the court is aware of the danger of inferring guilt in the present from a finding of guilt in the past, it does feel that a history of segregatory intent is not completely irrelevant to the inquiry."
Semi-related: here are two articles from Seattle, which moved back to a neighborhood system, saying that addressing diversity is beyond the scope of the role of public schools.
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2010303704_webboundary18m.html
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2010012165_webboundaries07m.html