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[quote=Anonymous][quote=Anonymous][quote=Anonymous][quote=Anonymous][quote=Anonymous][quote=Anonymous][quote=Anonymous]
Child #1 has sibling preference but ranked school ABC at #3, and didn't get into their #1-2.
Child #2 has no preferences but ranked school ABC at #1.

Who gets the seat at school ABC?

What if child #2's lottery number is higher than child #1's?[/quote]

Child #1. Sibling preference trumps no preference every time.[/quote]

I second this.  100% according to the logic of stable match.  School ABC prefers Child #2 over #1 so this creates an equitable match for all parties involved.[/quote]

We were arguing this point yesterday, but as of yesterday, who is disputing this part of it?

The part we are now disputing is this:
Same scenario as above EXCEPT Child #2 DOES have sibling preference.  Who gets the spot then if both children have sibling preference but Child #1 ranked the school #3 and didn't get into 1-2, vs. Child #2 who ranked the school #1?

If you believe parent ranking has no effect beyond what order the computer tries to place you, you believe basically that at this point it's random.  Those of us saying parent ranking matters are saying that in THIS scenario, Child #2 will get the spot.  Hands down.  And random computer assigned lottery number does not impact anything at this point.[/quote]

If the students are equal in terms of preferences, the one with the better number will get the spot, no matter what ranking the parent put.[/quote]

Notable that of all the people saying this, none of you have provided a source yet for why this specific point is true for this DC Common Lottery.  Interesting, and frankly, makes every opinion that says parent ranking doesn't affect this scenario totally suspicious.[/quote]

You want something else to read?  How about this http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2012/popular-economicsciences2012.pdf

Go to the section titled "Matching students and high-schools".  It says that what you believe is correct is not at all right and leads to gaming the system.

[quote]Since schools were more likely to admit students who 
ranked them as their first choice, students unlikely to be admitted to their favorite school found it 
in their best interest to list a more realistic option as their first choice, while applicants who simply 
reported their true preferences suffered unnecessarily poor outcomes. In 2003, Roth and his colleagues 
helped redesign this admissions process, based on an applicant-proposing version of the Gale-Shapley 
algorithm. The new algorithm proved to be successful, with a 90 percent reduction in the number of 
students assigned to schools for which they had expressed no preference. Today, a growing number of 
U.S. metropolitan areas use some variant of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.[/quote]

Now, go back to the links posted above and read about Gale/Shapely.  At no point is the parent/student ranking brought into acceptance.  It's only used to determined if they could get into a higher ranked choice.  It has nothing to do with the actual acceptance procedure.[/quote]

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